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ABSTRACT
TURKEY’S MILITRY EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS
AKSAÇ, MUSTAFA
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor; Asst. Prof. Hasan Ünal 
August 2003
This thesis analyzes Turkey’s military efforts for peace in the Balkans. With the end of 
Cold War, there have been remarkable changes in Turkey’s immediate environment. In the 
periphery of Turkey, including the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East have emerged 
instabilities and uncertainties due to disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, failed 
state structure in Iraq, and historic grievances in these regions. Under these circumstances, 
Turkey, considering that her security rests on the promotion and insurance of the peace and 
stability in her region, increased her contribution to promote regional peace and stability in 
return to consolidate her security. With this policy vision, in the Balkans, Turkey has made 
remarkable contribution to the promotion of regional peace and stability. This thesis examines 
Turkey’s peace efforts in the Balkans but the scope of the study is restricted to military efforts. 
In the study, Turkey’s military efforts for peace are examined in the bilateral and regional as well 
as international framework. As a conclusion, Turkey’s stabilizing role and significance of her 
contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans is clarified.
Keywords: Military efforts, Turkey’s Balkan policy, the Balkans, military relations, Turkey’s 
contributions, peace operations, regional peace and security.
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ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’NİN BALKANLARDA BARIŞ İÇİN ASKERİ GİRİŞİMLERİ
AKSAÇ, MUSTAFA
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Haşan ÜNAL 
Temmuz 2003
Bu tezde Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda barışa katkıda bulunmak için gerçekleştirmiş olduğu askeri 
girişimler incelendi. Soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle birlikte, Türkiye’nin çevresinde olağanüstü 
gelişmeler yaşandı. Türkiye’nin çok yakın çevre bölgelerinde. Balkanlar, Kafkaslar, ve 
Ortadoğu’da, Sovyetler Birliği ve Yugoslavya’nın dağılmasından. Kuzey Iraktaki otorite 
boşluğundan, ve bu bölgelerde tarihten gelen çatışmalardan dolayı istikrarsızlıklar ve 
belirsizlikler ortaya çıktı. Bu şartlar altında, Türkiye kendi güvenliğinin bölgesindeki barış ve 
istikrarın pekişmesi ve kalıcı hale getirilmesine bağlı olduğunu düşünerek, bölgesel barış ve 
istikrarın sağlanmasına katkısini, dolaylı olarak da kendi güvenliğini, artırdı. Bu politika vizyonu 
ile, Türkiye Balkanlardaki bölgesel barış ve istikrarın gelişimine dikkate değer katkılarda 
bulundu. Tezde, Türkiye’nin Balkanlardaki barış ve istikrara katkılarından askeri kapsama giren 
barış gayretleri incelendi. Çalışmada, Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda barış için yaptığı askeri 
girişimler, ikili ilişkiler, bölgesel ve uluslar arası kapsamlarda ayrı ayrı incelendi. Sonuç olarak, 
Türkiye’nin bölgesel istikrardaki rolü ve bölgesel barış ve istikrara katkılarının önemi ortaya 
kondu.
Anahtar Kelime: Askeri girişimler, Türkiye’nin Balkan politikası. Balkanlar, askeri ilişkiler, 
Türkiye’nin katkılar, barış operasyonları, bölgesel barış ve güvenlik.
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INTRODUCTION
For Turkey, the Balkans has been very specific from the geographical, 
political, defense and security as well as historical and cultural points of view, and the 
region has always had a significant importance in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda since 
the establishment of the republic in 1923. Turkey, realizing the strategic importance of 
the Balkans, endeavored to take part in every scheme actively, and played a leading role 
in several multilateral Balkan co-operation schemes.
With the end of Cold War, there have been remarkable changes in Turkey’s 
immediate environment. In the periphery of Turkey, including the Balkans, Caucasus 
and Middle East have emerged new areas of instabilities and uncertainties due to 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, failed state structure in Iraq, and 
historic grievances in these regions. Under these circumstances, Turkey, considering 
that her security rests on the promotion and insurance of the peace and stability in her 
region, decided to contribute to the promotion of the regional peace and stability in 
return to consolidate her security. Thus, she began to pursue a multilateral activist 
policy.
In the Balkans, Turkey has made remarkable contribution to the promotion of 
regional peace and stability. Turkey has contributed to peace operations in former 
Yugoslavia and Albania, launched new regional initiatives and improved her close 
military relations with regional states. This thesis argues that the activities of Turkish 
Armed Forces have been successful in the Balkans, and they have become a good 
argument for Turkey’s stabilizing role in the region and her Balkan policy, which stress
regional cooperation and integration as well as acting together with the Western and 
International community as much as possible. To prove its argument, this thesis 
examines Turkey’s peace efforts in the Balkans but the scope of the study is restricted to 
military efforts. In the study, Turkey’s military efforts for peace are examined in the 
bilateral and regional as well as international framework. It aims to clarify Turkey’s 
stabilizing role and significance of her contribution to peace and stability in the 
Balkans.
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter gives a summary of 
Turkey’s Balkan policy from the establishment of the Republic up to present. In the 
chapter, Turkish Balkan policy is outlined in four periods, including the interwar period 
(1923-1939), World War II Period (1939-1945), Cold War period (1945-1990) and 
post-Cold War period.
The second chapter examines Turkey’s contributions to peace operations in the 
Balkans in the post-Cold War era. In this era, Turkey has fully supported and 
participated in following peace forces and operations operate under the authority of UN, 
NATO and OSCE: UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force), IFOR (The 
Peace Implementation Force), SFOR (The Stabilization Force), Operation Sharp Guard 
and Operation Deny Flight conducted to bring peace and stability to Bosnia and 
Herzegovinia; Operation Allied Force and KFOR (Kosovo Force) conducted to solve 
the Kosovo crisis; AFOR (Humanitarian Aid Force) and MPF (Multinational Protection 
Force) conducted to promote security and stability in Albania and Operation Essential 
Harvest, conducted to demilitarize the National Liberation Army (NLA) and disarm the 
ethnic Albanian groups in Macedonia . In the chapter, to clarify the significance of 
Turkey’s military efforts for peace in the Balkans in the context of international
organizations, these operations are examined in an analytical framework from the point 
of Turkish military units.
The third chapter focuses on Turkey’s military efforts for peace in the Balkans, 
which has been in the regional context. Turkey believing that the regional problems can 
only be solved by means of regional framework has inaugurated new regional initiatives 
and fully participated in other regional initiatives in the Balkans. In the chapter, first, 
Turkey’s security perspective and shifts in her security policy after the Cold War are 
clarified, and then, the Multinational Peace Force in Southeast Europe (MPFSEE), 
Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) and Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBM) regime in the Black Sea, which serve as confidence building measures in the 
region, are presented in detail.
The last chapter is devoted to Turkey’s military efforts made in the context of 
bilateral relations to contribute peace and stability in the region. Turkey’s military 
efforts in the bilateral level are examined in two parts. In the first part, bilateral 
agreements made with the regional states in the security field, mainly bilateral CSBM 
arrangements, are outlined. In the second part, enhanced military relations with regional 
states are set out. At the end, in the conclusion part, an assessment of Turkey’s military 
efforts presented in this study is made.
CHAPTERI
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS
1.1 The Geopolitics of the Balkans
The Balkans, a peninsula extending toward the Mediterranean Sea in the south 
of the Europe, occupies a strategic region between Western Europe and Eurasia.^ The 
region is in the situation of a gateway between the Middle and Western Europe and the 
Middle East. It is a unique region for the transportation and communication between 
Western Asia with Middle Europe, and North Africa with the Middle and Northern 
Europe.^ The potential of the region for transportation, communication and economic 
integration with its alternative trade and energy roots makes it an important area not 
only for the regional countries but also for the whole world.
In the Balkans, defined as the Southeast Europe in the recent years, ten states, 
namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Greece, Macedonia, Slovenia, Romania and Turkey, continue to exist with different 
languages, religions and ethnic groups. Main problems of these states at bilateral and 
multilateral level arise from the disagreements on borders, territories and ethnic groups. 
Some of these problems include Kosovo question between the Albanians and Serbia and 
Montenegro, the Northern Epirus between Albania and Greece, Aegean and the 
Northern Trace as well as Cyprus problems between Turkey and Greece, Dobrudja
* Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayını, 21 nci Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye, Harp 
Akademileri Basım Evi, İstanbul, 2001 pp.l32.
 ^ Öztürk, Osman M .,‘Türk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’, Balkan Diplomasisi, Ömer E. Lütem, Birgül 
Demirtaş-Coşkun (ASAM, Ankara-2001), pp.1-32
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problem between Romania and Bulgaria and the disagreements between Greece and 
Macedonia on the use of the name Macedonia and national symbols.^
From the macro strategic point of view, the Balkans provide support and base 
regions for a military operation launched from the Middle and Eastern Europe to the 
strategic targets of the Straits, Suez Canal and certain oil fields.'  ^ In the same way, it has 
a similar strategic importance for the security of Europe. To be more precise, the region 
had a strategic importance for a forward defense for Europe in the past, and it still 
sustains this strategic importance since it affects security of Europe with its instabilities 
and crises. That is to say, the Balkans, with its rich underground resources and 
instabilities has a strategic function for the integration and security of Europe.^
Another particular point making the region special is its very wavy coasts that 
open to 6 seas including the Mediterranean system. The impacts of this geopolitical 
characteristic can be assessed in two ways. First, it increases the importance of the 
region for the strategies related with the Mediterranean. Second, it presents elasticity for 
the sea transportation in the region. ^
In addition to the past and present strategic importance of the Balkans, a new 
factor appeared with the disintegration of the Soviet Union has made the region much 
more important. Since the Balkans in a situation dominating the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, 
Middle and Eastern Mediterranean, the region with alternative energy routs has a direct 
impact on the transportation of the oil resources of the Caspian region to the
 ^ Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayını, 21 nci Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye, p .l35.
 ^Ibid, pp. 135
^Gürkan, “Jeopolitic ve Stratejik Yönleriyle Balkanlar ve Türkiye”, Balkanlar, İstanbul, Middle-East and 
Balkan Studies Foundation, 1997, pp. 261-264.
 ^Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayım, 21 nci Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye, p .l35.
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international markets. In this way, the strategic importance of the Balkans has 
increased.^
In the region, as a result of the historical developments and geopolitical 
features, different ethnic groups, languages and religions have existed side by side. 
Because of these variations, the region could not have gotten rid of itself from the crises 
and instabilities along the history.^ Thus, the ethnic pluralism, language and religion 
differentiation has been a fundamental tenet in the policy of the regional and external 
states.
When the geopolitics of the Balkans is examined from Turkey’s point of view, 
three points make the region very specific for Turkey. First, the Balkans is adjacent to 
Turkey and it is vitally important for the forward defense of Turkey. The domination of 
any state in the region pursuing a policy at the expense of Turkey may endanger 
Turkey’s security.
Second, the Balkans has gained a different, particular meaning for Turkey since 
the region is a gateway towards Western Europe, of which Turkey has become a 
member for decades.^ Besides, she has been making more than half of her foreign trade 
with Western Europe, and she has been pursuing a decisive policy to achieve a full 
membership of the EU. Since the region provides fastest and shortest links to Western 
Europe in a wide range of areas such as transportation, communication, and tourism as
 ^Öztürk, Osman M .,‘Tiirk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi, pp.1-32.
® İlhan, Suat, “Balkanların Gelişen jeopolitiği”, Türk Kültürü, Ankara, S. 430, February 1999, pp.77-80 in 
Osman M. Öztürk,‘Türk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi, pp.1-32.
 ^A. Hikmet Alp and Mustafa Türkeş, ‘The Balkans in Turkey’s Security Environment’, 
Turkish Review: Balkan Studies, Annual 2001, vol.6, pp.123-144.
well as the flow of ideas/® the Balkans is a strategic link between Turkey and Western 
Europe allowing Turkey to establish vital relationship and obtain significant interests/* 
Third, Turkey has received large numbers of migrants from the region since the 
late 19* century, and 1/5 of Turkey’s population today is of Balkan origin. Although 
these people have been integrated to Turkish community, they have kept alive their 
connections with the region. In the same way, as a result of about six hundred years of 
presence in the region about 2 million ethnic Turks still live in the Balkans outside 
Turkey in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Macedonia and Yugoslavia.*^ The crises and 
instabilities in the region affect Turkey by means of these citizens. To put it differently, 
the Turkish community in these states forms a firm basis for interaction and cooperation
between the regional states and Turkey 13
1.2 Turkey’s Balkan Policy
1.2.1 The Establishment of the Republic and The Interwar Period (1923-
1939)
Following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War, Turkey 
initiated her War of Liberation to secure her national territories, defend her 
independence and sovereignty against the Entente powers, Britain, Italy and France, the 
victorious powers of the First World War. As a result of the War of Liberation, Turkey 
managed to sign the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, which granted international
Aydın, Mustafa, Turkey at the Threshold o f the 2V‘ Century, International Relations Foundation, 
Ankara, 1998, pp.l22.
“ Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu, “Turkish Security in a Shifting Balkans: Reorientation to a Regional Focus”, 
Common Security Regimes in the Balkans , ed. Kosta Tsipis, pp. 95-139, Colombia University Press, New 
York, 1996.
Kut, Şule, “Turkey in Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self Restrain”, Turkish Review 
of Balkan Studies, 1996/97, pp.39-45.
Aydın, Mustafa, Turkey at the Threshold o f the 2T' Century, pp.l22.
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recognition for the independent and sovereign Turkey. With the Treaty of Lausanne, 
Turkey regained Anatolia and Eastern Thrace.
Since Turkey got her recognition as an independent state, three main factors 
have shaped her foreign policy attitudes. One was the international arena in which the 
Republic was established, the post-world War international politics. The second was 
Turkey’s intention to sustain the Republic as an independent and sovereign entity in the 
international system. The third was the domestic policy. Since the Turkish policy 
aimed at giving a shape to the new state, they decided to solve outstanding problems 
with other states. Within this framework, Turkey established diplomatic relations with 
all of her neighbors. In the Balkans, she concluded friendship agreements with Albania 
on 15 December 1923, Bulgaria on 18 October 1925, and peace and friendship 
agreement with Yugoslavia on 28 October 1925.*^
In this period, following years World War I, in the Balkans two groups of state 
appeared with regard to territorial settlement. They were revisionist and anti-revisionist 
groups. While Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania having made significant territorial 
gains formed the anti-revisionist groups; Bulgaria appeared to be a territorially 
dissatisfied one due to her losses. Bulgaria was one of the most dissatisfied states of 
Europe, since she had lost Macedonia totally, both Eastern and Western Thrace as well 
as Dobrudga. However, the division was not limited to the Balkan states.G erm any, 
Italy, Hungary were also in the revisionist group, and demanding a change in the order 
established through the post World War I peace settlements. On the other hand, the
Eylem, Altunya, Turco-Albanian Relations(1923-1997), The Middle East Technical University 
Institute o f Social Science, Ankara, Augost 1997. ( Unpublished Master Thesis)
Barlas, Dilek, “Türkiye’nin 1930’lardaki Balkan Politikası”, Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi; 200 Yıllık 
Süreç, İsmail Soysal, Türk Tari Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1999, pp. 361-386.
A. Hikmet Alp and Mustafa Türkeş, ‘The Balkans in Turkey’s Security Environment’, pp.123-144.
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leading actors of the new order, England and France, were in the anti-revisionist group, 
wishing to preserve the status quo.
Turkey needed a peaceful order to consolidate her new frontiers and to reorder 
its new state. She took her place in the anti-revisionist group and assessed the revisionist 
group as a threat to her security. She participated in international organizations aiming 
to prevent war and solving the disagreement by peaceful means. For example, she 
joined the League of Nations in 1932, in which France, and Greet Britain had in an 
influence.
Right after the signature of the Lausanne Treaty (23 July 1923), the only 
Balkan State, with which Turkey had serious problems, was Greece. In particular, the 
population exchange caused severe tension in the Turkey-Greece bilateral relations. 
This issue dominated Turkey’s bilateral relations with Greece and her Balkan policy in 
the period of 1923-1930. The disagreement between Turkey and Greece on the 
population exchange issue stemmed from about the number of nationals to be 
exchanged and about who would be accepted as settlers, and whether the head of the 
Orthodox Church in Istanbul be a part of this exchange problem. With Venizelos 
coming into power in Greece, the tension between two states decreased and they 
reached an agreement on 10 June 1930. According to the agreement, all the Greek 
population living in Istanbul and all the Turkish population living in Eastern Thrace was 
accepted as settled and they excluded from the exchange program. With the solution 
of this severe issue, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations normalized and one of the greatest
obstacles to initiate cooperation in the Balkans was overcome. 19
Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayını, Balkanlardaki Gelişmeler ve Türkiyeye Etkileri ile Balkanlar- 
Türkiye Otoyol Projesi, Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, İstanbul, Mayıs 1999.
Armaoğlu, Fahir H., Siyasi Tarih. 1789-1960, Sevinç Matbası, Ankara, 1973 pp. 644-645.
Sander, Oral, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965) Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1969, pp. 8-9
9
Meanwhile Mussolini had begun to pursue an assertive and revisionist policy in 
the region. Italy’s intention to revive the Rome Empire caused the Balkan states to feel 
insecure and made the coming Italian danger apparent for them.^° Italian revisionist 
intentions toward the anti-revisionist Balkan states forced them to act together against 
the common threat. Turkey became concerned about Italian intentions in the 
Mediterranean and Anatolia. She pursued an active and multilateral policy for 
collaboration among Balkan states. A series of conferences with the attendance of all 
Balkan states was held in Athens, Istanbul, Bucharest, and Salónica respectively from 
1930 to 1933. Turkey suggested a Balkan Pact with the idea of creation an Eastern 
Lacarno in the Balkans. With this pact, Turkey aimed to prevent a great power 
intervention in the region and Turkish Foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras suggested 
that this Pact be not to be sponsored by any great powers.^^
For the realization of the Balkan Pact, Turkey played an active role and took the 
lead in the Balkans. She signed an agreement with Greece to guarantee their borders 
mutually, and this agreement became a milestone in the negotiations leading to the 
Balkan Pact. She then signed similar agreements with Romania and Yugoslavia 
concerning Bulgaria’s revisionist intentions. The aims of these agreements were to 
guarantee current borders mutually and prevent revisionist policies. Thanks to these 
agreements, tension among the Balkan eased and mutual trust prevailed. As a result, 
Turkey, Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia established the Balkan Pact on 9 February 
1934. With this Pact, parties guaranteed their borders and they promised not to sign an
agreement with any Balkan state without consulting each other.22
Amıağolu, Fahir, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (¡914-980), İş Bankası Yayınlan, Ankara 1983, pp.327-328. 
Barlas, Dilek, ‘Türkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold 
War Eras’, Turkish Review: Balkan Studies,_ Annual 1998-99, vol.4, pp.65-80.
Öztürk, Osman M. , ‘Tiirk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi, pp.1-32
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Balkan Pact did not last long. In 1937, Yugoslavia signed a friendship treaty 
and non-aggression pact with Bulgaria. Since the Balkan Pact had been formed against 
Bulgaria, such an agreement was contrary to the aim of the Balkan Pact.^^ In October 
1940, when Italy attacked Greece, the Balkan Pact was finalized.
Turkey, in the interwar period, pursued a policy giving aimed at the survival of 
the newly established state and insurance of her independence.^“^ She knew that she 
could attain this goal through establishing friendly relations with her all of neighbors. 
She, therefore, became active and a leading actor in her region to contribute to the 
maintenance of the status quo.
1.2.2 World War II Period (1939-1945)
German invasion of Czechoslovakia and Italian invasion of Albania in 1939 
caused Turkey to search for security in her region against Axis powers even before the 
war began. Italy’s expansionist policies in the Mediterranean, the setting up of military 
installations in the Dodecanese by Rome her invasion of Eritrea in 1935 revealed that 
the Balkan Pact could not provide for sufficient guarantee. It also revealed how serious 
a threat Italy had become. Despite the fact that Germany pursued a revisionist policy by 
not living up to her commitments of the Versailles treaty, this did not affect Turkey’s 
bilateral relations with Germany. If anything, Turkey’s exports to Germany increased, 
and the public opinion did not seriously react to German revisionism until the 
occupation of Czechoslovakia. Turkey wanted to see Germany a balancing power
Sander, Oral, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965), pp. 12.
Gönlübolu, Mehmet, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, (1913-1973), Baskı, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 
1974, pp.106.
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against the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Consequently, although German revisionist 
intentions concerned Turkey, she considered Italy as the main threat to her security.“^
In her search for security against the Axis powers, Turkey decided to take her 
place on the side of Great Britain and France to enforce her security and contribute to 
the maintenance of the status quo. Turkey signed the Mutual Cooperation Agreement 
with Great Britain and France in 1939. This alliance included the following 
commitments by the parties.^® First, Turkey would help Great Britain and France if the 
war spread to the Mediterranean, and if the war did not spread to the Mediterranean, 
Turkey would stay neutral vis-à-vis her allies. Second, in case of an attack by a 
European state to Turkey, Britain and France would help Turkey. Third, Turkey would 
help Britain and France as long as these states fulfilled their guarantees for Romania and 
Greece. In addition to these commitments, the Alliance included a Turkish reservation 
concerning the USSR. The Turkish reservation was a declaration that the three partite 
agreement would not force Turkey to take any action against the USSR. It was a 
guarantee for the USSR that it would not face any threat from Turkey, due to her 
commitments to three partite Alliance.^^
Although Greece was not a party to the agreement, Turkey agreed to help 
Britain and France as long as they fulfilled their guaranties for Greece and Romania 
against revisionist countries. This issue clearly shows the strategic importance of the 
Balkans in Turkey’s security, and Turkey’s active policy to provide her security by
means of forward defense.28
Günay, Göksu Erdoğan, II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde îç ve Dış Politika 
Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkzm, Türk Dış Politikası Analizi, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, pp.477-492. Der Yayınevi, 
2001.
Gönlübol M. and Sar C., “1919-1938 Yıllan Arasında Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası” in Olaylarla Türk 
Dış Politikas (1919-1990), Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara 1993, p.99.
Yılmaz, Veli, Siyasi Tarih, Harp Akademiler Basımevi, İstabul, 1998, pp.239-240.
Öztürk, Osman M. , ‘Türk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi^ PP U .
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During the war, Turkey came under serious pressure. In October 1940, 
according to the three partite Agreements, when Italy attacked Greece, Turkey should 
have joined the war, but the German threat prevented her. Turkey declared to both 
Britain and France that she would enter the war in case Italy occupied Salónica, or in 
case of an attack on Greece by Bulgaria. As neither came true, Turkey remained out.^^
When the risk of German domination over the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
Suez Canal became almost a reality, Britain asked Turkey to join the war. Since Turkey 
was uncertain about the intentions of the Soviet Union, she did not accept this proposal 
though she remained loyal to her Alliance with Britain.
At one stage Britain suggested a Balkan Block, including Turkey, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and even Bulgaria against Germany, but such an alliance could not be 
formed. Turkey wanted the Soviet Union to join the Bloc, and she wished the United 
States to actively support it. In short, Turkey was searching for real guarantee for her 
security.
Throughout the war, Turkey succeeded in maintaining her neutrality. Although 
she signed the Mutual Cooperation Agreement with Great Britain and France in 1939, 
she neutralized herself signing non-aggression agreements with Russia, Bulgaria and 
Germany respectively.^® Towards end of the war, as it was clear that the Axis powers 
were about to be defeated, the Allies declared that the founding members of the UN 
would be those states who had declared war on the Axis powers before 1 March 1945 in 
Yalta Conference. Turkey, a wholehearted supporter of peace efforts, declared war on 
the Axis powers on 23 February 1945 to take her place in UN.®^
Armağolu, Fahir, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Ankara 1995, pp. 408 in Veli Yılmaz, Siyasi Tarih, Harp 
Akademiler Basımevi, İstabul, 1998, pp.241
Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayını, 21 nci Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye, pp. 169-175. 
Altunya, Eylem, Turco-Albanian Relathns(1923-1997), The Middle East Technical University Institute 
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1.2.3 The Cold War Period (1945-1990)
With the end of the Second World War, the world began to take a bipolar shape 
under the hegemony of two victorious powers, namely the United States and the Soviet 
Union. After the war, the Soviet Union’s efforts to establish buffer zones in the Balkans, 
her pressures on the regional states and her military existence became a serious concern 
for the region.^^ For Turkey, she became a major security threat in this period. In 1945, 
she declared that she withdrew herself from the Friendship and Fraternity Treaty and 
demanded a realignment of the borders in east Anatolia and wanted to establish a 
military base on the Straits.^^ Upon these demands, Turkey sought the support of the 
West against this threat. As a result, Turkey took her place in the Western Block 
becoming a member of Western oriented organizations. She joined OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the Council of Europe in 
1948, and she became a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 
1952.
In time, the divergence between the two blocks in the fields of military, 
politics, and economy grew and the two super powers engaged themselves in a struggle 
to balance each other in every sphere of world politics. The Balkan states became one of 
the areas where the two fought actively. Whereas Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania 
took their place on the side of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Greece preferred the 
Western block. The division of the region restrained Turkey’s role and diminished her 
alternative policies. In particular, increasing Soviet influence on Bulgaria became a
direct threat to Turkey 34
Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp 120.
Yurdasev, Ersin, “1945-1989 Döneminde Türkiye ve Balkanlar’’, Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi; 200 Yıllık 
Süreç, İsmail Soysal, Türk Tari Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1999, pp. 374 
Öztürk, ‘Türk Diş Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi, pp.1-32
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At the beginning of the cold war, Turkey appeared to be in a difficult situation 
as she had no friend in the Balkans, except Greece. Revisionist intentions of the Soviet 
Union in the Balkans brought Turkey and Greece closer.^^
As for Yugoslavia, she was excluded from the Soviet block in 1948, and 
approached the West. She began to take military and economic support from the United 
States. Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, all of whom were under Soviet influence, 
encircled her. These made her cooperate with Turkey and Greece in the Balkans.
As a result, the policy and attitude of the Soviet Union and her satellites, 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia came close. Yugoslavia joined Turkey and Greece and 
signed on 28 February 1953 an agreement with them. With this agreement, three states 
distinguished the principles of the cooperation and agreed to cooperate in the field of 
economy, culture and defense. On 9 August 1954, to turn this Friendship and 
Cooperation Agreement into an alliance three states established the Balkan Pact. This 
alliance would be valid for 20 years, and any attack on a member of the Pact would be 
considered, as an attack on all parties, and it would be repulsed collectively.^^
The Balkan alliance did not last long due to the attitudes of Yugoslavia and 
Greece. After the visit of Khrushchev to Belgrade and Sofia following the death of
Stalin, Yugoslavia’s policy towards the Balkan Pact changed and her enthusiasm died 
out. However, main responsibility in the failure of the Pact belonged to Greece since
she intended to use the Balkan alliance for the realization of her intentions on Cyprus. 
Froml955 onwards, as Turkey and Greece found themselves in a severe conflict, the
oo
Balkan alliance lost its efficiency and significance.
Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayını, 21 nci Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye, pp.189-190. 
pp. 191-192.
Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikas (1919-1973), p.257-262.
Armağolu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-980), pp 524, in Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye 
(1945-1965) Siyasal Bilgiler Yayını, Ankara, 1969, ss.35-125.
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Upon the deterioration of bilateral relations with Greece due to national 
problems such as Cyprus, Turkey initiated a search for new alternatives to balance 
Greece in the region and she eased her rigid ideological position toward Warsaw Pact 
member Balkan states. She intended to come close to Yugoslavia and Romania, and she 
tried to improve her bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.^^ But, 
Turkey’s efforts to improve her bilateral relations with Bulgaria did not bear any fruit 
due to Bulgarian policy towards Turkish minority in this country
During the cold war, Turkey, being a Western oriented state and member of 
NATO, could not pursue an active and effective policy in the region as she had pursued 
in the interwar period. Her membership to NATO and the West limited her area of 
maneuver. In other words, she could pursue an autonomous and independent Balkan 
policy. Her role like the other Balkan states was relegated to regional politics. Since the 
regional states were divided into blocks and came under the influence of the super 
powers, they searched for integration into the international organizations such as NATO 
and Warsaw Pact rather than on regional organizations.'*^
1.2.4 From the end of the cold war to the present
With the end of cold war, dramatic changes in the international environment 
forced Turkey to reshape her foreign and security policy. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia completely changed the environment in which Turkey 
pursued a policy of protecting and promoting her national security and economic well
Özcan, Gencer, “Countinuty and Change in the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans” in Balkans; A 
Mirror o f the New International Order edited by Güney Göksu Erdoğan and Kemal Saybaşılı, Eren 
Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık Ltd. Şti., İstanbul, 1999, pp.281-293.
öztürk,‘Türk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ Balkan Diplomasisi, pp.1-32 in Gencer özcan, “Türk Dış 
Politikasında Süreklilik ve Değişim: Balkanlar Örneği”, Kemali Saybaşılı ve Özcan Gencer (der.) Ten/ 
Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar, Bağlam Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1997.
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being, and it presented new options for Turkey. Under the impacts of these remarkable 
changes, Turkey’s foreign and security policy changed considerably.
The most remarkable changes have been in the policies that Turkey has 
pursued with the aim of increasing her influence in the regions, namely the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, Balkans and Middle East. These new policies have become multilateral 
and intended to consolidate her western identity. In these regions, although Turkey has 
intended to become an active regional actor, she has avoided unilateral acts and she has 
favored acting within the context of international organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, 
UN, or she has tried to take the support of great powers in particular the US. Turkey 
being a member of many regional and international organizations intended to use her 
membership in these organizations as a new and effective policy instrument.
In the Balkans, Turkey did try to influence the developments for her own sake 
and in line with her own national interest right after the end of cold war. To that end, 
Turkish policy makers decided that establishing good political and economic relations 
with as many Balkan states as possible and active contribution to stability in the region 
would be in Turkey’s national interest.'^" In this period, Turkey not only made an effort 
to improve her bilateral relations with the Balkan states, she also urged them to use all 
available means to promote co-operation, rejecting a return to the divergences of the 
past. She ruled out the speculations for the formation of alliances, which would divide 
the Balkans into two groups. It was such a division that Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania would have formed one group while Greece, Serbia 
and Russian Federation would have formed the other. Greece, having serious problems
Barlas, k, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold War Eras’, Turkish 
Review: Balkan Studies, pp.65-80.
Kut, Şule, “Turkey in Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self Restrain”, Turkish Review 
o f Balkan Studies, 1996/97, pp.39-45.
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with Macedonia, Albania and Turkey, attempted to develop an orthodox axis, but she 
soon realized that any policy hampering regional co-operation and giving a way to 
polarization in the region would not work anymore.“*^
Turkey’s peace efforts in the Balkans have been in the context of international 
organizations. Although Turkey is deeply concerned with the events that took place in 
former Yugoslavia from the very beginning and became frustrated with Western states’ 
indecisive and inconsistent policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey did not 
deviate from her foreign policy tenets, emphasizing cooperation with international 
organizations.'*'^ Turkey’s efforts intended to react international community rather than 
acting unilaterally, and she contributed to the peace and stability of the region within the 
framework of UN, NATO and OSCE.
In this era, Turkey realized the importance of pursuing an activist multilateral 
policy in the context of regional and international organizations and believed that the 
problems in her region could only be solved by means of regional framework. She 
supported economic integration and cooperation among nations and she participated in 
all of the initiatives in the region, and initiated the Black Sea Economic Co-operation 
Organization. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation is an important initiative, which 
contributes to peace and security in the region by means of multilateral economic co­
operation,'*^ and it demonstrates Turkey’s security vision in the new era. Turkey has 
proposed the establishment of a multinational peace force in the Balkans to promote 
peace and stability in the region, and it was accepted by the Balkan states. A peace force 
at the level of brigade was established in the Balkans.
A. Hikmet Alp and Mustafa Türkeş, ‘The Balkans in Turkey’s Security Environment’, Turkish Review: 
Balkan Studies, pp.123-144.
Çalış, Şaban, ‘Turkey’s Balkan policies in the Early 1990s’, Turkish Studies vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001) 
pp. 135-146.
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This policy cannot be said to be absolutely successful, given that Greece has 
made quite a lot of gains in political terms over the last decade whereas there is very 
little sign that Turkey became an important actor in Balkan politics.
Bilman, Levent, “The Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Southeast Europe and Turkish Foreign
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CHAPTER II
TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA
2.1 Peace Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina
2.1.1 Description of Events
Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the six constituent republics of former 
Yugoslavia. Four about four decades, Tito managed to control different nations and 
ethnic groups under his communist regime.
But when Milosevic came to power in former Yugoslavia, Serbian nationalism 
increased dangerously. The Serbs’ unequal treatments and pressure towards other 
nations and ethnic groups grew incredibly. After terminating autonomous statue of 
Kosovo, Milosevic declared that they became victorious this time with the complete 
integration of Kosovo to Serbia in a speech at he ceremony of 600* year of historical 
Kosovo War. He added that there were other wars on the horizon. This development 
created instability and insecurity all over the country. Other republics were concerned 
about Serbian intentions to dominate Yugoslavia by means of force.'^^
In 1990, for the first time since 1920, multiparty elections were held in the 
republics. Through these elections, nationalist parties came to power in Croatia, 
Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Serbia, the communists came into power as
Policy”, Perceptions, September-November 1998, Volume III Num. 3, www.mfa.gow.tr 
Elekdağ, Şükrü, Balkanlardaki Son Gelişmeler ve Türkiye’ye Olan Etkileri, Harp Akademileri Basım
Evi, İstanbul, 2000, pp.5.
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socialist.'^’ With the elections, a change in the political structure of former Yugoslavia 
began. During the discussions, Slovenia and Croatia supported the idea of a 
confederation consisting of sovereign and independent states. Serbia strongly rejected 
this idea and advocated the idea of recentralization in the countr)'."*®^
In this process, the first independence declaration came from Slovenia in 1991. 
Since the rate of Serbian population is very small in Slovenia, the Federal Army of 
Yugoslavia left the country after some skirmishes and Slovenia got her independence. 
Then, Croatia declared her independence, and Macedonia followed suit.
In 1991, Slobodon Milosevic proposed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia to 
unit under the Republic of Federal Yugoslavia, but Bosnia-Herzegovina did not accept 
this proposal, since she was afraid of Serbian domination in such a federation. Finally, 
1992 referendum revealed the intention of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. 
Bosnian Serbs with the support of the Federal Army revealed their opposition to the 
declaration of the independence, by declaring the Republic of Bosnia-Serbia and 
starting organized attacks against Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the 
conflict intensified.
2.1.2 The UN Response
The first response to the crisis in former Yugoslavia by the UN came on 25 
September 1991. To prevent intensification and extension of the conflict, the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 713, calling on all members
ibid
Efegil,Ertan, United Nations Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) a Case Study for  
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to implement “a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia”
To stop the fighting and find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the UN made 
some efforts in the form of peacekeeping operations. It created necessary conditions for 
the peace operations by adopting several resolutions. On 21 February 1992, the UNSC 
established UNPROFOR. On 7 April 1992, the UNPROFOR was authorized for full 
deployment through resolution 749.
The mandate of the UNPROFOR was to protect the three “ United Nations 
Protected Areas” (UNPAS) main centers of the conflict, namely Eastern Slavonia, 
Western Slavonia and Krajina, in Croatia from armed attacks and to demilitarize them. 
As the conflict escalated more, monitoring many other areas of Croatia was added to the 
mandate of the force. Upon the extension of the conflict to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
mandate and strength of UNPROFOR were enlarged to provide security and functioning 
for the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to that city and 
its environs. In addition, monitoring the “no-fly” zone, banning all military flights in the 
airspace of Bosnia, and the UNPAs declared by the Security Council around five 
Bosnian towns and the city of Sarajevo were included. Meanwhile, tension grew all 
over the region and the Macedonian government demanded deployment of the 
UNPROFOR contingent in its own territory because of the fear that a civil war might 
break out. UNPROFOR was also deployed in Macedonia to monitor and report any 
developments in the border areas, which could undermine confidence and stability in
that republic.50
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/p-miss.htm.
WWW.un.org. /Depts/Dpko/mission/unprofor.htm
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2.1.3 Turkey’s Perspective
In the beginning of the crisis in former Yugoslavia erupted due to Serbia’s 
aggressive nationalism, and the separatist tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia, Turkey 
officially and consistently supported a diplomatic solution within the territorial integrity 
of former Yugoslavia.^* In this period, Turkey assessed that the disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia might cause a turmoil and instability in the region, and she pursued a policy 
of supporting territorial integrity of former Yugoslavia even during the war in Croatia. 
From Turkey’s point of view, former Yugoslavia had been a rational and important 
actor in the Balkan balance in general and for Turkey’s security and strategic 
calculations. She had friendly relations with Turkey earlier and supported Turkey’s 
Balkan policies in 1980s.^^ Second, she had been a benign ruler over the Turkish 
minority and Muslim population. Third, Yugoslavia allowed the land transit route for 
Turkish trade and transportation with Western Europe. Last but not least, a destabilized 
Yugoslavia could bring a flood of Albanian and Bosnian refugees to Turkey and could 
worsen the financial and economic situation in the country. Considering that the 
fragmentation of former Yugoslavia would serve neither her neither regional nor 
specific interests, Turkey did not wish to see the disintegration of former Yugoslavia 
and stressed the importance of maintaining interethnic harmony in Yugoslavia.^^ But 
the fast disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing bloody wars made Turkey 
reconsider her line of policy.
Kut, Şule, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiative for Bosnia Hercegovenia”, in Balkans: A Mirror of 
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During the dissolution process, upon the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia 
by the US and the European Community (EC), and recognition of Macedonia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Bulgaria, Turkey recognized the independence of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina together with other former Yugoslav republics in February 1992.^" 
Turkey’s new line of “collective recognition” was not initially a total change in her 
position. Turkey pursued her policy of desiring a diplomatic solution and resolving 
problems between Yugoslav republics without resorting to force until the war broke out 
in Bosnia.
When the conflict spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the news of ethnic 
cleansing and atrocities against the Bosnian Muslims being broke in Turkish media, 
Turkey changed her position and attitude in Yugoslavia crises.^^ The reasons including, 
the strong reaction by the Turkish public opinion toward Serbia, the lack of a firm 
Western response to stop this tragedy and pressure from the Muslim sphere forced 
Turkey to change her p o lic y .A s  a result, the new policy of Turkey towards Yugoslav 
crisis became more active, multilateral and pro-Bosnia one.
In the international arena, the conflict was perceived as a civil war, but it was 
not so for Turkey. Turkey having geographical and historical ties with the region 
perceived Serbian action as aggression upon independent country because she knew 
well that Serbia wholeheartedly supported Bosnian Serbs in their actions. Turkey tried 
to persuade international community that Serbian aggression was a direct threat to the 
sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and violation of human rights of her citizens. With 
her active and multilateral policy, Turkey worked within the UN, European
Çalış, ‘Turkey’s Balkan policies in the Early 1990s’, Turkish Studies, pp. 135-146, in Ismail Soysal, 
“Günümüzde Balkanlar, Türkiye’nin Tutumu Kronoloji ve Genel Bilgiler, in Balkanlar, 1993.
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Press, San Francisco, 1993, pp 152.
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Organizations, namely the EC, CSCE and NATO, Muslim organizations and regional 
organizations to end the conflict.^’ She pressed her allies within NATO and the EU to 
adopt more serious efforts in Bosnia and warned of the probable consequences that 
might result in if the crisis was to spread. Turkish representatives in the UN and the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) tried to convince their 
Western counterparts of the necessity of pressuring Serbia to stop the war.^^
Turkey, from very beginning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, advocated a 
limited international military intervention through air attacks on aggressor, or if this 
could not be fulfilled, the lifting of arms embargo imposed on Bosnia.^^ During the 
crisis, Turkey tried to persuade the international community that the arms embargo 
imposed on Bosnia in the name of impartiality was a mistake because it prohibited 
Bosnia to procure weapons and equipment vitally important for its self-defense. Turkey 
argued at all international forums that the arms embargo was ineffective for Bosnian 
Serbs because they had already got the Yugoslav Federal Army’s supplies and the 
heavy weapons and were able to receive weapons from outside despite the embargo.^®
One of the most important initiatives that Turkey launched to end the conflict 
had been the Action Plan, which she submitted to the United Nations Security Council 
on August 7, 1992. Turkey’s Action Plan including necessary diplomatic and military 
measures in detail to stop Serbia was a summary of ongoing efforts of Turkey in 
international circles and her policy towards Bosnian crisis. This plan was important 
because it was the first action plan in international arena. Turkish Action Plan did not
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target Serbia directly; it was aimed at the Serbian aggression, which jeopardized the 
independence, unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The core of 
Turkish arguments was that aggressor could be deterred only if effective sanctions and 
credible warnings were employed. Thus, the plan involved limited air strikes and a non­
fly-zone over Bosnia.®^
Although Turkey was to be disappointed by the West, she did not deviate from 
her foreign policy principles emphasizing cooperation with the West and international 
organizations. She consistently ruled out the option of unilateral use of force, she 
engaged in diplomatic initiatives to mobilize international community to take a more
serious position against Serbian aggression 62
2.1.4 Contributions to UNPROFOR
On 21 February 1992, as the UNSC adopted resolution 743 calling for the 
establishment of UNPROFOR, Turkey declared her readiness to make available her 
armed forces for UNPROFOR. For a long time, the UN circles, especially Secretary- 
General Butros Ghali, did not accept Turkish participation in peace force in Bosnia. 
They argued that Turkey being a Muslim and regional state having cultural and 
historical ties to Bosnia could not stay impartial.*^^
As the situation in Bosnia worsened and Russian troops deployed, especially 
around Sarajevo between the Serbs and the Moslems, Turkey expressed again to 
participate in UNPROFOR. UN Secretary General did not give a positive answer, on the
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grounds that deployment of a regional state’s troops in the area of conflict might create 
tension among regional states. In response, the Turkish government argued that the 
deployment of Russian troops and Greek military observers did not intensify the 
conflict. After the diplomatic initiatives of Turkish government, the Security Council 
had to accept the deployment of additional troops in Bosnia upon request of Secretary- 
General. After the negotiations between the UN representatives and Turkish 
government, the deployment of Turkish troop in Central Bosnia became a reality.
Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia had also objected Turkish participation. Greek 
Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis stated that Turkey and Greece should not take 
part in any UN military intervention in Bosnia, on the grounds that Turkish participation 
in the force would create problems in the Balkans.^^ Greek proposal was that regional 
countries and countries having involved the problem historically should stay away from 
UNPROFOR. Greek Cypriots also opposed the UN decision allowing Turkey’s 
participation.^^ In addition, Bosnian Serbs opposed the deployment of Turkish UN 
troops, arguing that Turks being successors of Ottoman that had ruled Bosnia for over 
500 years would be biased in favor of Bosnian Moslems.^^
Despite these objections, Turkey contributed a regiment size unit with 
sufficient combat service support and combat support units to peace force. The first part 
of the Turkish unit, on 27 May 1994, and its greater part unit arrived in Split on 27 June.
^  Efegil, United Nations Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) a Case Study for Future 
Peace-Keeping Operations, pp. 115.
Islimye, Mustafa, Military Interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia: A Case Study for Peace Support 
Operations (Lessons For Turkey), The Middle East Technical University Institute o f Social Science, 
Ankara, September 1998, PP. 7 4 , in FBIS-WEU-93-035, February 1993.
Islimye, Mustafa, Military Interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia: A Case Study fo r  Peace Support 
Operations (Lessons For Turkey), The Middle East Technical University Institute of Social Science,
Ankara, September 1998, PP. 74 (Unpublished Master Thesis)
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On 4 August 1994, it took over its responsibility in US sector as a subunit of 
Multinational Division North (MND, N).
Although Turkey’s contribution to UNPROFOR was accepted as a result of her 
decisive and constructive efforts, international community felt the necessity of testing 
Turkish position in the crisis and tense situation, whether she could remain her 
impartiality or not. They tested Turkish position with the construction projects for civil 
services. The first project given to the Turkish contingent was a Serbian Orthodox 
Church. Turkish contingent performed the first task in an extraordinary patient and 
careful manner. Then, a catholic church and a music school were given to Turkish 
contingent to repair. These tasks were also undertaken successfully, and finished before 
the dead line. These initial projects became tests for the Turkish contingent. This 
attitude of international community meant to a certain degree, “ you were so willing to 
contribute, so you should undergo whatever you face”.^  ^ Although this attitude tried to 
deter and test the Turkish contingent, the decisive and positive efforts of the Turkish 
contribution to peace in Bosnia were carried on professionally. Mandate of the Turkish 
unit was to protect responsibility area, Zenica region, from fear of arm attacks, to ensure 
and help the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to monitor and report 
developments that could change the course of the operation.
As for composition of the unit, Turkish unit had mainly the commander of 
Civil-Military Co-operation and three mechanized infantry companies, supplied with 
different equipment than a standard mechanized infantry company and additional 
mechanized infantry company as a security company assigned to protect SFOR 
Headquarters. As the combat units, it had a signal platoon, a signal intelligence team, a
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tactical air control party and an engineer company. As the combat service support units, 
it had a logistics support unit.
Turkish contingent was made up of 1457 men, 79 of whom were officers, 129 
non-commissioned officers (NCO), 1198 soldiers and 51 civilian personnel. It was one 
of the best-equipped contingents within UNPROFOR. It had 106 mm mortars, 6 milans, 
39 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 260 vehicles, trucks, bulldozers, loaders and 
construction machinery.^^
Turkish area of responsibility was located in the intersection of three 
Multinational Divisions of US, France and Canada and consisted of an area of 1700 km. 
square. In the Turkish unit area of responsibility, the Bosnian Moslem population was 
78%, Croatian 10%, Serbian 4%, and others including Albanians, Kosovar, Jews, 
Montenegrins, Gypsies and Sandzac citizens.
The main part of the contingent was deployed in Zenica, the Commander of 
Turkish Regimental Task Force and guard company were in Sarajevo and national 
support unit in Split. Force protection team and liaison officers were at the US base in 
Tuzla. The area, Split-Sarejevo-Zenica-Tuzla line, over which Turkish unit was
deployed, was certainly a logistically important area.70
2.1.5 Involvement of NATO in Bosnia Crisis
The political basis for the Alliance's role in former Yugoslavia was established 
at the North Atlantic Council meeting in ministerial session in Oslo, in June 1992. In 
that meeting, for the first time, NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness to 
support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with their own procedures.
^  Söylemez, Yüksel, “An Overview of Turkish-Croatian Relations”, Turkish Reviev o f Balkan Studies, 
1996-7, v .3 ,p .99-l 14.
™ Akgönenç, ‘Türklerin Balkanlar ve Bosnadaki Yeni Katkılarına Bir Örnek: Bosna’da Türk Tugayı”, 
p.1845.
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peacekeeping activities under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). This included making available Alliance resources and expertise for 
peacekeeping operations.^*
In December 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers stated that the Alliance was 
ready to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations 
Security Council. Ministers assessed peacekeeping and sanctions or embargo 
enforcement measures already being undertaken by NATO countries to support the 
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions about the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia. They indicated that the Alliance was ready to respond positively to further 
initiatives that the UN Secretary General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in 
this field.^^
After the political basis of NATO’s role established in Oslo, involvement of 
the Alliance in various maritime, air and ground operations supporting UN objective in 
former Yugoslavia increased its role in Bosnia Crisis. From 1992 until the signing of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement at the end of 1995, the Alliance took several key 
decisions, which created necessary conditions for the operations conducted by NATO 
naval forces, together with the Western European Union, and NATO air forces. The 
Alliance’s air forces made valuable contribution to the solution of the conflict. To that 
end, it provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and carried out air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other 
threatened areas. Decisive action by the Alliance in support of the UN, together with a 
determined diplomatic effort led to a genuine cease-fire and made a negotiated solution 
to the conflict possible in autumn 1995.^  ^ With the signature of the General Frame
“The Process o f Bringing Peace in former Yugoslavia”, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm 
’^ibid.
“NATO’s Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, www.nato.int/docu, 26 January 2003
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Work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995, the Alliance 
launched Operation Joint Endeavor. The Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed to 
implement military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. After it completed its one- 
year mission, Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced it.
2.1.6 Turkey’s contributions to NATO-Led Operations
2.1.6.1 IFOR (The Peace Implementation Force)
The UN efforts to solve Bosnian crisis did not provide any progress and the 
Serbs continued with their attacks, in particular, artillery fire and violent actions, on 
Bosnian Muslims. As an artillery fire killed 37 civilians and wounded 85 civilians in a 
market place, in late August 1995, NATO started to bomb Serbian targets intensively 
and it went on firmly its operation. Decisive action by the Alliance in support of UN 
together with a determined diplomatic effort bore fruit and, Serbs could not resist much 
and withdrew their heavy weapons from vicinity of Sarajevo. Then, they accepted both 
a cease-fire and negotiating for peace. After long meetings in US (Ohio-Dayton), 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Agreement) was signed in Paris on 
14 December 1995.
On 14 December 1995, as the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1031 
transferring authority for peace operations from the UN to NATO and giving NATO a 
mandate to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. To implement the 
military aspects of this Agreement, in December 1995, the North Atlantic Council 
launched the largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Join 
Endeavor. The Implementation Force (IFOR), a NATO-led multinational 
Implementation Force of some 60,000 personnel was deployed in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina. IFOR brought together NATO and non-NATO countries in a coalition for 
peace.^‘‘ It took over the responsibility on 20 December 1995 and transferred it to 
SFOR (Stabilization Force) on 20 December 1996.
2.1.6.1.1 Mandate
Upon the UN Security Council transferring authority for peace operations 
from the UN to NATO and being established IFOR, Turkey reinforced the Turkish 
Regiment in UNPROFOR to the brigade size and assigned it to IFOR. The Turkish 
contingent being a subunit of US division contributed to IFOR.
The mandate of Turkish brigade in IFOR was to implement the military 
aspects of Peace Agreement and it contributed to the accomplishment of the following 
tasks:
Bringing about and maintaining the cessation of hostilities; separating the 
armed forces of Bosnia's two newly created entities, namely the Bosnian Muslim - 
Croat Entity (the Federation) and the Bosnian - Serb Entity (the Republika Srpska) by 
mid-January 1996; transferring the areas between the two entities according to the peace 
agreement; and moving the parties' forces and heavy weapons into approved storage 
sites. These goals were achieved by June 1996. For the remainder of the year, Turkish 
brigade continued to perform military tasks given to IFOR, such as patrolling along the 
de-militarized Inter-Entity Boundary Line (lEBL) and regularly inspecting over the sites 
containing heavy weapons and other equipment.
see, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, www.nato.int/docu, 26 January 2003
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2 .1.6.1.2 Composition and Deployment
To fulfill these tasks in its area of responsibility, the Turkish unit was 
reinforced to the brigade size. At the end of January 1996, a tank company, an artillery 
company and a mechanized infantry company to provide security for IFOR Headquarter 
joined the Turkish Regimental Task Force and the whole force was reorganized as a 
brigade. These developments did not affect the previous deployment of Turkish unit and 
it fulfilled its tasks without any change in its deployment.
2.1.6.2 SFOR (The Stabilization Force)
The IFOR had successfully completed its one-year mission, which was the 
implementation of military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, 
with the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections. However, there were 
difficult tasks to be done for achieving a lasting peace. After assessing the ways of how 
the Alliance might continue to provide support for the establishment of a secure 
environment in the post-IFOR period, NATO authorities concluded that a reduced 
military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for consolidating peace. 
They agreed that NATO should organize a new task force, which was subsequently 
activated on 20 December 1996; the date the IFOR mandate expired.^^ These 
developments led SFOR (Stabilization Force) to be established as a successor of IFOR. 
NATO members and 13 Partner countries, reducing their military power, organized 
SFOR under the authority of NATO, which took over the responsibility on 20 
December 1996.
On 12 December 1996, UN Security Council, adopting resolution 
1088,authorized SFOR to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement as the
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legal successor to IFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR has been fulfilling its mission under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). The main mission of SFOR is to 
contribute to the safe and secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. 
Its mandate includes the following specific tasks:^^
• To deter or prevent a resumption o f hostilities or new threats to peace.
• To promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move
forward.
• To provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities.
It also stands ready to provide emergency support to UN forces in Eastern
Slavonia. Although SFOR, consisting of 31000 personnel, is only half size of IFOR, it 
operates within the same command and control structure.^^
2.1.6.2.1 Mandate
Since IFOR provided a considerable development in the peace process, SFOR 
with reduced military existence had a more ambitious mandate. The mandate of Turkish 
unit was to conduct peace operations in its area of responsibility to ensure military 
compliance in accordance with General Framework Agreement for Peace and to 
promote a safe and secure environment for the civil implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accords. It was to undertake military tasks, such as, securing the protection of the 
force, maintaining freedom of movement, continuing to remove illegal weapons and 
ammunitions, supporting the professionalization of Entity Armed Forces (EAF), 
supporting NATO Infrastructure Committee (IC) in the civil implementation of the 
Agreement. The force was in a way to represent Turkish Republic, Turkish Arm Forces
see, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, www.nato.int/docu, 26 January 2003
See, SFOR’s Role and Mandate, http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm, 28 January 2003
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in the best in an international operation and to protect Turkish national interest in the
region.
2.1.6.2.2 Composition and Deployment
The Turkish brigade assigned to SFOR was reduced to battalion size in this 
period. The number of military personnel decreased from 1333 to 843. But it fulfilled its 
tasks without any change in its deployment.
Since the importance of the civilian military co-operation (CIMIC) was 
increased and it played an important role for maintaining peace and stability, a unit of 
CIMIC was established to fulfill these tasks:
• To conduct civil-military coordination between International
Organizations and local authorities to support implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accord,
• To support international organizations in providing humanitarian 
assistance to refugees and displaced people,
• To coordinate the efforts of rebuilding the commerce and infrastructure,
• To facilitate the democratization process,
• To support state institutions,
• To provide security behind the local and regional police
2.1.6.3 Activities
The Turkish unit to implement its mandate has been fulfilling both military 
tasks and CIMIC activities. Military tasks include the followings:
Altmsoy, Mustafa, UN Peace Operations, Yeditepe University Institute o f Social Science, Istanbul 
2000 pp. 130. (Unpublished Master Thesis)
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• Monitoring and patrolling on the zone of separation: The aim of this task 
is to monitor whether two sides fulfill their responsibilities related with zone of 
separation
• Establishing check-points: It is conducted to control entrance and exit of 
the area of responsibility and to take measures for a possible public action on time on 
main roads at different stops.
• Patrolling in city (day and night). It is conducted on the different days of 
week to ensure permanent security.
• Active patrolling: It is conducted on the alternative roads controlling 
main roads to take measures in case of any conflict related with transportation and 
traffic.
• Monitoring and escorting military actions of two sides: It is conducted 
to monitor the permitted military activities of both side including military training, 
firing drill and transfers
• Joint tasks with International Police Task Force: These tasks are 
conducted to monitor the local police and local police check points
• Collective patrolling with the neighboring forces and civil military co­
operation: These activities are conducted to provide a mutual support and coordination 
among different national units performing the same mission by improving friendly 
relations and mutual understanding
To achieve these tasks, Turkish Battalion Task Force (TUBNTF) employs 15- 
20 vehicles, about 100 personnel and drives 150 km. daily. The size of the teams varies 
according to events.
In addition, TUBNTF monitored general election, conducted on 11 November
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2000. It has also been making operations to collect unregistered guns, ammunition and 
explosives from local people.
UN and NATO-led peace operations conducted in Bosnia had two 
dimensions, peacekeeping and peace building. After a secure environment provided by 
peacekeeping operations, namely UNPROFOR and IFOR, peace building process was 
initiated by SFOR. In this process, TUBNTF reorganized itself by establishing the unit 
of CIMIC to contribute peace building process and by conducting new tasks such as 
humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and building works, cultural activities, medical 
and logistic support. To accomplish these tasks, TUBNTF has trained all of its leader 
personnel.
Current activities of CIMIC Unit are planned weekly. It has five 
reconnaissance teams, and each team has a sector to patrol in the AOR of TUBNTF. In 
their patrol, reconnaissance teams contact local authorities and civilians according to the 
weekly plan. To get information, they use a form in their interviews wit the inhabitants. 
Information gathered in these contacts is transferred to database, and the unit has 
prepared a database covering the region. All the personnel of headquarter can use this 
data by means of a network. There is an information sheet for every village in which all 
the subjects are covered. CIMIC Unit has conducted successfully following activities 
and its efforts continue to contribute to peace more at the moment.
• TBTF constructed 2 schools and 1 bridge and repaired 45 schools, 43 
hospitals, theatres and similar state buildings and 4 bridges, and completed restoration 
of 36 mosques and 8 churches.
• 19 Water supply systems and disposal sites were repaired. The main 
road of Pasin-Konak, in the length of 4.5 km, was also repaired and opened to public
37
service with a ceremony including all local administrations in October 2000.
• Ze-Do Conton Sports Association Administration Building, Zenica 
Turkish Park and the roads of 50 villages have also been reconstructed.
• The Civil-Military co-operation (CIMIC) teams of TUBNTF have also 
been conducting patrols to Collective Centers (CC) within their area of responsibility. 
These patrols provide relief, support and medical aid for the Displaced Persons (DPs) 
living there. There are 14 Collective Centers in the area of responsibility of TUBNTF. 
It provides logistic and medical support 1491 refugees in certain periods in these 
camps
• 30 tons of food provided by the Red Crescent was distributed to the 
needy in the area of responsibility.
• The villages and schools are visited from time to time and given 
clothes, food and medical aid. Stationary distributed to students.
• In order to collect all unregistered weapons, ammunition and explosive 
from local people, operations have been going on. In the Harvest Operation, which 
SFOR began in 1998, TUBNTF in coordination with CIMIC Unit carried out a weapons 
harvest operation in Zavidovici in July 2002. As a result, harvest brought in more than 
96 rifles, 11 rocket launchers, and 28,028 rounds of ammunition in total. Along with the 
rifles and ammunition there were also 949 hand grenades, 68,700 grams of TNT, 62,550
7Qgrams of gunpowder, 192 fuses, as well as mortar and artillery rounds.
• Courses on mines and bubby traps were given 3550 students and 182
teachers.
Capt. Russell Craig, “Turks Aids Collective Centers”, SFOR Informer, May 23, 2002, 
www.nato.int/sfor/nations/ various /turkey/turmed.htm, 28 January 2003.
’’ Lt. Antonio Ruiz González and Sgt. Kelly Whitteaker, “Turkish Troops Collect and Destroy Weapons 
during Annual Harvest”, www.nato.int/sfor/nations/ various /turkey/turmed.htm, 28 January 2003.
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• The Special Medical Unit of TUBNTF, manned by 38 medical 
specialists including four doctors, one dentist, one pharmacist, one chief nurse, five 
nurses, seven specialists for the laboratories and surgeries, and 2 0  soldiers for various 
services, in addition to the SFOR soldiers, examines about 50 local people every day.^° 
TUBNTF also provided wheelchair and medical equipment to 25 veterans. Since the 
beginning from 1994, it provided medical support to 92 000 needy people. Finally, it 
distributed 2440 food packages to poor people distinguished by local authorities.
• TUBNTF has contributed 10 computers the economical and pedagogic 
high school in Zenica. The computer education, which cost 30.000 DEM, started to 
serve to the education of the youth in October 2000.
• In the national holidays and religious festivals, TUBNTF has also been 
organizing different activities, such as concerts and festivals with the attendance of local 
people. In the organization of 23 April Public Celebration for kids, the folklore, picture 
and music contests have being organized among schools, and rewards have being given 
to the winners. In the same manner, 19 May Youngster Racing has been organized 
every year.®^
• TUBNTF has also launched a tree planting campaign in Zenica. In the 
plantation of 3000 of KM, children from the 31 schools of Zenica, helped by Turkish 
soldiers, planted 500 trees and hung a nominal coin on each tree, bearing the name of 
their schools. Campaign was launched with a ceremony including speeches, orchestra 
play, and traditional dance show. Although the plantation campaign is a symbolic and 
just a stage, it sufficed to sow the seeds of peace and hope among Bosniacs. François- 
Xavier Miller appreciated this campaign by writing in his article as the roots of the
See, Capt. Gjon Vorfi, “The Turkish Special Medical Unit”, SFOR Informer, December 24, 1997, 
www.nato.int/sfor/nations/various /turkey/turmed.htm, 28 January 2003
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future, as much as the soundness of links between Turkish contingent and local people
R9would only grow and beautify.
• To contribute these activities, TBTF has set up a fund based on 
voluntary contribution. In average, 10.000 DEM is provided through this fund every 
month. Together with the humanitarian assistance, restructuring and repairing activities, 
it is estimated than total value of these activities has amounted to 2.170.640 DEM.
Turkish unit has accomplished many other activities together with the 
mentioned activities above, and its effort to contribute to rebuilding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is going at the moment.
2.1.6.4 Operation Sharp Guard
On 8 June 1993 the Councils of NATO and the WEU, at a joint session, 
reviewed the embargo operations and approved a combined concept of operations for 
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 820, which strengthened the 
existing embargoes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). This concept included a single command and control arrangement for the 
combined operation "SHARP GUARD" under the authority of the councils of both
organizations.83
On 15 June 1993, Sharp Guard was started conduct operations to monitor and 
enforce compliance with UN sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions. With this operation, for more than three years, NATO and WEU 
effectively enforced both economic sanctions and an arms embargo. This helped to
Akgönenç, “Türklerin Balkanlar ve Bosnadaki Yeni Katkılanna Bir örnek: Bosna’da Türk Tugayı”, 
p.1994.
François-Xavier Miller, “The Roots of the Future”, SFOR Infor, March 7, 2001, 
www.nato.int/sfor/nations/ various /turkey/turmed.htm, 28 January 2003
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create the necessary conditions for the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
During Sharp Guard no ships were reported as having broken the embargo. To achieve 
this result, during the period 22 November 1992 to 18 June 1996 about 74,000 ships 
were challenged, almost 6,000 were inspected at sea and more than 1,400 were diverted 
and inspected in port. '^^
On 1 October 1996, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1074, 
declaring that it was satisfied with elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in line with 
Peace Agreement, the Security Council decided to immediately terminate all sanctions 
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 2 October 1996, following the UN decision, 
NATO and WEU announced that. Operation Sharp Guard was terminated, in 
accordance with the direction of the NATO and WEU Councils.
Turkey was against all forms of arm embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
she tried to persuade international community not to implement an arm embargo against 
that country. Turkey was aware of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Serbian 
forces were taking all kinds of support through their land border from Serbia, and the 
Croats were getting regular supplies from Croatia proper, the Bosnian Muslims were 
lack of any kind of support, and they were caught unprepared to Serbian attacks. Turkey 
became unsuccessful in her attempts to persuade allies but she implemented UN 
decisions until the US declared, in the spring of 1995, that it would not implement arm 
embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Turkey assigned 2  frigates, a tanker and a minesweeper to this operation, 
which was conducted in the Adriatic Sea. Throughout the operation, in total, 18
See, “NATOAVEU Operation Sarp Guard” www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm, 26 January 2003. 
See, “NATO/WEU Operation Sarp Guard” www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm.
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Frigates/Destroyers 2 submarines, 4 tanker vessels and about 5000 personnel
participated in the operation 85
2.1.6.5 Operation Deny Flight
The Operation Deny Flight was initiated on 12 April 1993 and it had conducted 
different tasks until 20 December 1995. Its mission included tree types of tasks.
1. To monitor and enforce compliance with UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) which banned flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the “No-Fly-Zone” (NFZ).
2. To provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground.
3. To conduct approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the 
security of UN-declared safe areas.
Turkey contributed to Operation Deny Flight an F-16 Squadron consisting of 
18 aircraft. They were based in Ghedi Air Base in Italy to support SFOR operations. 
First, this squadron was assigned to Operation Deny Flight and Turkish aircraft flew 
more than 2820 hours in this operation. From 14 October 1995, the number of aircraft 
has been gradually reduced to current strength of 5 aircraft. In addition, 13 F-16 are on- 
call status of 72 hours in Turkey. In total, 12 F-16 fighter squadrons and 2500 personnel 
are participated in the operation in turn from beginning to present.
All Turkish aircraft contributed to the no-fly-zone mission, and they performed 
the combat air patrol (CAP) surveillance, and reconnaissance flights during their 
missions. Between 29 August 1995 and 14 September 1995, Turkish aircraft performed
Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, the press o f General Staff, Ankara, 2001,pp.9.
** See, “NATO Operation Deny Flight”, www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/natoun/opdenyflight.html, 28 
January 2003.
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78 sorties, totaling 2.2 % of the overall air missions and no casualties were reported 
during the operations.
2.2 Peace Operations to solve the Kosovo Crisis
‘There is no Albania without Kosovo and vice versa’ 88
Kosovo is the central axis of the Albanian question in former Yugoslavia. The 
characteristics it held made it a potential source of possible dangerous explosions in the 
Balkans. The roots of Kosovo problem trace to Balkan war, when the great powers 
artificially separated Kosovo from Albania and annexed it to Serbia calling Kosovo as 
the Serbian Jerusalem.^^
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population, of which the 
majority is ethnic Albanians. The conflict that stemmed from Serbian intention of 
removing autonomous status of Kosovo and bringing it under direct control of Serbia 
increased gradually and became a potential threat to regional and international peace 
and security in 1998. Because of the humanitarian consequences and risk of spreading it 
to other countries, Kosovo crisis required efforts of all international community to 
provide a lasting peaceful solution. To solve Kosovo crisis, the peace operations started 
with Operation Allied Force and has been going on through Operation Joint Guardian.
Islimye, Mustafa, Military Interyentions in Somalia and Yugoslavia: A Case Study for Peace Support 
Operations (Lessons For Turkey), The Middle East Technical University Institute o f Social Science, 
Ankara, September 1998 in gopher://gopher.nato.int:70/l
Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 22 March 1992 in his study Miranda Vickers and Jemes Pettifer, 
Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity, Hurst and Company, London, 1997
Paskal, Milo. “Albanian Question witliin the Current Context of the Balkan Crisis Balkan Forum, 
p.119-133
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2.2.1 Description of the Events
The Serbian intentions over Kosovo led to a similar process, to what had 
happened in Kosovo obtained its autonomous status in 1974 under Tito regime. In 1974, 
it got more extensive rights similar to a republic. As Solobodon Milosevic came power, 
Serbian pressure and unequal treatments increased and Milosevic regime abolished the 
autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989. Kosovar Albanians opposed the move strongly 
and conflict broke out in Kosovo.
During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and 
Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and 
forced 400,000 people from their homes. The international community became gravely 
concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it 
spreading to other countries. President Milosevic's disregard for diplomatic efforts 
aimed at peacefully resolving the crisis and the destabilizing role of militant Kosovar
Albanian forces made the conflict severe.90
2.2.2 The UN Response
UN Security Council, adopting Resolution (UNSCR) 1199, expressed deep 
concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav 
army, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. UNSCR included limits 
on the number of Serbian forces in Kosovo, and on the scope of their operations, 
following a separate agreement.^‘
It was agreed that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) would establish a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to observe compliance
www.nato.int/docu/facts/2 0 0 0 /kosovo.htm 
www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm
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on the ground and that NATO would establish an aerial observation mission. UN 
Security Council, adopting Resolution 1203, declared establishment of these two 
missions.
Although the task force was deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia under the overall direction of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
both of the missions of observing compliance could not be performed since the situation 
in Kosovo deteriorated.
On 10 June 1999, as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted the 
principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis after the air strikes, the UN 
Security Council adopted resolution (UNSCR 1244) referring to the Security Council's 
decision to deploy international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under UN 
auspices. The Security Council decided that the political solution to the crisis would be 
based on the principles, including an immediate and verifiable end to violence and 
repression in Kosovo, the withdrawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces of 
the Federal Republic, deployment of effective international and security presence, with 
substantial NATO participation in the security presence and unified command and 
control, establishment of an interim administration, the safe and free return of all 
refugees, a political process providing for substantial self-government, as well as the 
demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and a comprehensive approach
to the economic development of the crisis region.92
2.3 Turkey’s Perspective
Turkey pursues peace and stability in her region, and primary objectives of 
Turkish foreign policy have been to establish and maintain friendly and harmonious
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relations with all states. With this foreign policy vision, Turkey seems satisfied with the 
status quo and she clarified her position with her officials’ words and deeds. Turkey is 
not an expansionist country as some countries claimed, and she has not pursued an 
expansionist policy toward Kosovo problem. Turkey knew that Kosovo had 
constitutional rights, autonomous status, and saw that first these rights were abolished 
and then all the ethnic Albanians were forced to flee the country or faced with 
massacres. In her status quo policy toward the region, she perceived that these 
developments were products of an expansionist policy, and that this policy was tinged 
with crimes against humanity. Therefore, it should be prevented from escalating.
During the disintegration process of former Yugoslavia, Turkey revealed her 
policy toward the region by recognizing all the republics of former Yugoslavia that 
declared independence “indiscriminately” as her foreign policy principle after the 
United States and the European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia, and 
Bulgaria recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. However, since Turkey’s 
size, wealth, ties with Muslim population in Bulgaria (over one million Turks), Kosovo, 
Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia, policy toward Greece and her political resurgence 
within the new world disorder provided her with a critical role in the region,^·  ^Turkey’s 
policy toward the region was assessed by some countries, in particular Serbia and 
Greece, as expansionist.
Turkish officials disclosed Turkish perspective on Kosovo crisis explicitly. 
While Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who spoke at a press conference at the ministry 
defined Turkey’s policy toward Kosovo as " pursuing a policy to prevent Kosovo from
92 ibid.
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turning into a new B osnia",D efense Minister Hikmet Sami Turk said that Turkey's 
policy would be to secure "autonomy for the ethnic Turkish minority in Kosovo within 
the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Onur Oymen, Turkey's permanent 
representative at NATO, said that Turkey was in favor of an enhanced autonomy for 
Kosovo within Yugoslavia's territorial integrity
Turkey in her search for taking more active role in the diplomatic efforts for a 
peaceful solution to Kosovo conflict volunteered to build a bridge between the regional 
countries and the Contact Group, in June 1998. Offering Turkish assistance. Foreign 
Minister Ismail Cem wrote a letter to British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. In the 
letter, Cem pointed out that the Kosovo conflict prompted concern among regional 
countries about the security and stability of the region, and that Turkey hoped closer 
contact would be established between the regional countries and the Contact Group.^’ 
After a visit to Albania, President Suleyman Demirel sent letters to allies in NATO and 
Balkan countries, urging them for immediate action to stop the violence in Kosovo. 
Demirel also sent a letter to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, demanding that he 
immediately withdraws Serb security forces from the region and begin a dialogue with
the Kosovor side 98
Turkey repeatedly condemned Serbian violence in the region and tried to 
mobilize international community. In Demirel’s words "Kosovo is the continuation of 
Bosnia," and he urged the world to prevent repetition of experiences in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the early I990s^^. Speaking at a press conference. Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit, called on the West to act more decisively by saying the civilized world
Ankara determined to support air Strikes, Turkish Daily News, March 26, 1999. 
^  Ankara preparing for NATO Strikes, Turkish Daily News, March 25,1999, 
^^Turkish Daily News, August 6, 1998 
^^Turkish Daily News, August 11,1998.
Turkey Determined to Support Air Strikes, Turkish Daily News, March 26, 1999
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could not stand by idly and watch "Serbian brutality" anymore. He defined conflict as a 
fire strong enough to bum the Balkan region, and criticized the Serbs and those who 
supported them for being responsible for that.^ *^ °
However, Ankara refrained from advocating independence for Kosovo, since 
this move would not comply with her foreign policy tenet of respecting territorial 
integrity of other states. She was concerned that this could put it in a difficult position in 
her policy toward the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), fighting for 
independence in Turkey's southeast. Although there are some marginal claims being 
made on the international level that the case of the Kosovar people in Yugoslavia is the 
same as that of the Kurdish people living in southeastern Turkey^°^ and there are 
certainly some fears in Turkey that the Kurdish issue may turn into a parallel 
situation; there is almost no similarity between the Kosovo conflict and the terrorist 
activities of PKK in Turkey’s southeast. For example, Kosovo was given a high degree 
of autonomy by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during Tito’s regime, and with this 
aspect, there is a legal dimension of the Kosovo problem. Turkey is a unitary state, 
accepting equal all of its citizens before law, while new Yugoslavia established after the 
disintegration of the Tito’s former Yugoslavia was a federal state, and the ethnic 
Albanians could not use their rights equally with Serbs. In addition, there are other 
differences from the point of social stmcture. In Turkey, Kurdish people have freedom 
of living anywhere they want, and freedom of choosing any job they want. Kurdish 
people have been fully integrated to Turkish community not isolated and marginalized
Ankara preparing for NATO Strikes Turkish Daily News, March 25, 1999.
Turkey's role in NATO operations: A chance not to be missed, Turkish Daily News, April 12, 1999., 
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as ethnic Albanians. Countless marriages made between two communities are a tangible 
prove of this reality.
Although Turkey supported an operation upon deterioration of the situation 
and failure of the diplomatic effort, she did not want Allies to declare a full-scale war 
against Serbia. She supported an operation that did not target Serbia directly, but force 
her to accept a peaceful solution. In his comments on the ongoing developments in 
Yugoslavia, Defense Minister Hikmet Sami Turk clarified Turkish attitude on the air 
strikes by stressing that the offensive was not aimed at declaring a war against that 
country, instead it was to persuade the Serbs to accept a peaceful solution to the Kosovo
crisis.
Turkey having geographical and historical ties to the region was deeply 
concerned about the Kosovo events, and pursued an active policy to find a just and 
lasting solution to the problem. Since peaceful efforts did not provide any progress, 
Turkey fully supported Operation Allied Force and KFOR to prevent Serbian atrocities. 
Turkey assigned an F-16 squadron to Operation Allied Force, and a battalion size unit to 
KFOR. It also assigned frigates, destroyers, tanker and minesweeper vessels to support 
this operation.
2.2.4 Turkey’s Contributions to NATO-Led Operations
2.2.4.1 Operation Allied Force
All international efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict led nowhere. 
Serbian nationalists did not accept the proposal of the six-nation Contact Group and 
Serbian military and police forces increased the intensity of their operations against the
Ünal, Hasan, “Balkanlar’da Geniş ‘Arnavutluk M eseslesi’ ve Türkiye”, Avrasya Dosyası, Sonbahar 
1998, VOİ.4 number 1-2, pp.l49.
Turkey Determined to Support Air Strikes, Turkish Daily News, March 2 6 ,1999.
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ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, in a clear breach of compliance with the agreement 
concluded in October 1998. As a final chance, Alliance agreed to ask Slobodon 
Milosovic to prevent violent attacks of Serb forces or face NATO air strikes. Milosevic 
rejected the proposal and NATO air strikes. Operation Allied Force started on 24 March 
I 9 99 105 operation aimed at ensuring Serbia to comply with the UNSCR (1199).
It lasted 77 days, which forced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to accept a Military- 
Technical agreement.
Turkey contributed to this air operation in two ways. It assigned one F-16 
Fighter Squadron consisting of 10 F-16 aircraft in the beginning. They were based in 
Ghedi Air base and then NATO asked Turkey to contribute additional aircraft and air 
bases. Upon these requests, Turkey assigned its second F-16 Fighter Squadron including 
8 air crafts and 3 tanker crafts as on-call status in Bandırma air base. In addition, Turkey 
opened her air bases in Bandırma, Balıkesir and Çorlu. NATO planned to deploy 36 F- 
16 aircraft to Bandırma, 62 F15 to Balıkesir and 9 tanker aircraft to Çorlu Airbases. 
Turkish aircraft participated in the air operation day and night. They realized 444 sorties 
and flied more than 2 0 0 0  flying hours to fulfill their missions under every condition.
In the air operation, Turkish contribution played an important role in the 
success of the operation, since Turkish aircraft were the only air unit, except the US air 
units, that completed their night missions throughout the operation.
2.2.4.2 KFOR (Kosovo Force)
After the withdrawal in accordance with a Military-Technical Agreement 
concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of 9 
June, Secretary General of NATO stated that NATO, with the forces which had
Bosna-Hersek ve Kosova Hava Harekatı, Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, Ankara, 2002, pp. 52
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contributed to Operation Allied Force, and to the cohesion and determination of all the 
Allies, was ready to undertake its new mission to bring the people back to their homes 
and to build a secure environment Kosovo. The Security Council meanwhile authorized, 
in June 1999, member states and relevant international organizations to establish an 
international security presence, and decided that its mandate would include deterring 
renewed hostilities, demilitarizing the KLA and establishing a secure environment for 
the return of refugees in which the international civil presence could operate. Following 
the adoption of UNSCR 1244, the North Atlantic Council made immediate preparations 
for the rapid deployment of the security force (Operation Joint Guardian), mandated by 
the UN Security Council.
As agreed in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of the security 
force, KFOR, was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from 
Kosovo. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well 
established in Kosovo. Turkey contributed to KFOR a mechanized infantry battalion 
supported with sufficient combat support and combat service support units. Turkey 
provided distinguished humanitarian assistance for suffering Kosovars by assigning a 
field service company to the Humanitarian Aid Force (AFOR), deployed in Albania.
2.2.4.2.I. Mandate
Turkish Battalion Task Force completing its preparations set off to Kosovo 
from Mamak in Ankara on 1 July 1999 and took over responsibility of its area in 
Kosovo on 13 July 1999. Since then, TUBNTF has been conducting peace operation in 
its area of responsibility.
ibid, 63.
www.nato.int/kfor
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The mandate of TUBNTF is to ensure the implementation of the Military- 
Technical Agreement signed by NATO and the Republic of Federal Yugoslavia, and the 
responsibilities accepted by Serbian Forces and Kosovo Liberation Army namely, to 
deter Serbia from attacking Kosovo and to defend Kosovo in case of any aggression as a 
subunit of KFOR; to ensure security of the borders of Kosovo w i^thin its area of 
responsibility and to perform military exercises for improving and maintaining 
sufficient combat force.
To implement this mandate, Turkish contingent has been fulfilling following 
operational and humanitarian tasks:
Operational:
• border control
• patrol and checkpoint conducting
• search operation
• monitoring the Draga§ and Tuzsuz quarter in Prizren
• CIMIC activities
Humanitarian:
• limited school repair work
• cooperation with UNICEF
• medical care by military doctors of TBNTF
2.2.4.2.2 Composition and Deployment
Turkish Battalion Task Force (reinforced mechanized battalion) comprises of 
1081 personnel including Azerbaijani and Georgian platoon*°^. Its main equipments are
www.kforonline.conVkfor/nations/turkey.htm, KFOR Contingent: Turkey 
military unit consisting o f about 40 personnel.
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M60 A3 tanks, ZMA, and 81 mm armored mortar carriers.“ °As for its subunits, at the 
beginning, it had mainly two mechanized infantry company and a tank company as a 
combat force. It also had one combat support unit and sufficient combat service support 
units. As a result of mashed improvement in the security environment in Kosovo, the 
tank company, together with combat support unit, which consisted of heavy weapons, 
was replaced with the third mechanized infantry company on 16 June 2002. Georgian 
and Azerbaijan platoons have contributed to KFOR as a subunit of TUBNTF in its area 
of responsibility whose headquarter is located at Printex Factory in Prizren.
Turkish Battalion Task Force has been deployed in Prizren region within the 
German sector as a subunit of MNB (S), Multinational Brigade-South. All units of 
TUBNTF, except two mechanized infantry company, are deployed in Prizren. One of 
the mechanized infantry company is deployed in Mamu§a village, and the other 
mechanized company is deployed in Draga§, 25 km. south of Prizren."^
2.2.4.2.3 Activities
Since the mandates of both SFOR and KFOR are similar to each other and 
include the elements of peace building, the activities of the Turkish unit in KFOR, 
military and of the CIMIC unit are also similar to the activities of SFOR.
To fulfill successfully its mandate, TUBNTF has been conducting these 
military activities; establishing check points, monitoring and patrolling within its area of 
responsibility and, conducting point and area operations, on the zone of separation.
TUBNTF patrols along two borders at the same time. They are the borders of 
Macedonia and Albania. The military task that mostly occupied TUBNTF is the
KFOR Contingent: Türkiye, www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo.htm.
Beksac, Zeynel and Raif Kirkul, Mehmetçik Kosova’da, Kosova Türk Yazarlar Dereneği, Prizren, 
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patrolling of these borders and villages around Draga§. As the troops of TUBNTF 
capture any illegal border crosser, they turn them over UNMIK police in a standard 
police manner.
TUBNTF has been helping to deter violence and to maintain law and order in 
its area. To this end, it has contributed to the demilitarization and transformation of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In addition to the thousands of weapons handed over 
voluntarily as a part of the demilitarization process, many weapons held illegally have 
been seized and destroyed by TUBNTF.
TUBNTF has contributed to the mine cleaning operation in its AOR. The 
explosive ordnance disposal teams of TUBNTF have cleared all the major routes and 
population centers, and marked the remaining sites known to contain mines or other 
unexploded ordnance. In Draga§ and Prizren regions, these teams removed or marked 
3710 mines or unexploded ordnance.^^^
To accomplish these activities, TUBNTF employs 230 personnel and 31 
vehicles and conducts 15 checkpoints, 20 patrols on different routes daily.
Together with military tasks, TUBNTF has started civil-military co-operation 
and public relations activities to fulfill civilian dimension of its mandate. It has 
conducted these activities up to now.
• The food, cloth, and cleaning materials provided by Turkish Red Crescent 
have been distributed to all of the villages in its area of responsibility.
• Medical team of the Red Crescent supported by the medical team of 
TUBNTF, conducted general medical checkup. They have treated 34.078 civilians.
distributed 214.000 pieces of drug, and vaccinated 6.348 children 113
112
113
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54
• 1544 children were circumcised in the infirmary of TUBNTF and many 
other places in Kosovo.
• TUBNTF has repaired 5 schools, 4 generators, 2 mosques, built an 
additional building to Mamu§a Elementary School and distributed 29.825 pieces of 
stationary.
• The engineering unit of TUBNTF has also repaired roads of 30 villages.
• TUBNTF has given many courses, including the courses of mines and 
bubby traps, and occupation courses. In the mine courses organized in the villages and 
schools with the aim of educating public and children, 23.823 civilians were educated
and made aware of the mine danger. 114
• In the national holidays and religious festivals, TUBNTF has been 
organizing different activities, such as concerts and festivals with the attendance of local 
people. In the organization of 23 April Public Celebration for kids, the folklore, poet, 
picture and music contests were organized among schools, and rewards were offered to 
the winners. In the same manner, on the memorial days of 19 May, different sporting 
activities and concerts have being organized every year. The national holiday of 30 
August Victory Turkish Military Day has been celebrated with the attendance of a large 
number of local people from different ethnic groups, representatives from international 
organizations, and military and civilian officials. Among all these, the celebration of 
anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey is the most magnificent. Since 
attendance to these celebrations has been at the highest level, celebrations have been 
organized in Prizren city center in recent years.
ibid,pp.79.
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• In addition, TUBNTF has set up a humanitarian aid fund to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the needy, to contribute to the restoration of common 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, roads, fountains, to supply 
their requirements, and to contribute to the education of the children and youth.
TUBNTF has successfully conducted these activities and it has planned many 
activities such as offering English, Turkish, as \vell as computer courses together with 
Anatolia Development Organization, and building of a new school.
2.3 Operation Essential Harvest
On 22 August 2001,upon the request, of the Macedonian government NATO 
began demilitarizing the National Liberation Army (NLA) and disarming the ethnic 
Albanian groups operating on the territory of the country. The operation was to be 
conducted for a period of 30 days and it was named Operation Essential Harvest. The 
aim was to collect and destroy all weapons voluntarily handed in by NLA personnel. 
The operation started on 26 August and involved some 3500 NATO troops and their 
logistical support. It managed to collect about 3875 weapons and 397600 other items, 
including mines and explosives.**^
Turkey participated in Operation Essential Harvest with a company. The 
Turkish company assigned to Harvest Operation in Macedonia became a subunit of 
TBNTF in Kosovo. The Turkish company was deployed in the region of Skopje Airport 
and conducted its activities under the tactical control of Italian Battalion between 11-23 
September in 2001. The Turkish contingent conducted 2 tasks of collecting weapons 
from the ethnic Albanians, and it succeeded in collecting 678 weapons in different
116 www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm
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types. After fulfilling its task successfully under the authority of NATO on 27 
September, the Turkish company returned Turkey.**^
2.4 Operation Allied Harbour
In April 1999, Serb paramilitary forces and the regular army unit began a 
campaign of terror in Kosovo, nearly one million Kosovar Albanians were expelled and 
it caused many others to become internally displaced in order to hide in the hills to 
escape the brutality of the ethnic cleansing. Ethnic Albanians driven to neighboring all 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania were given shelter; food, protection but these 
were done under severe conditions.
Albania embraced the Kosovars and took more than half a million of them. 
However, the Albanian government could not handle the hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo that needed protection, housing, and food, and 
the Tirana government requested the assistance of NATO. On 16 April 1999, the North 
Atlantic Council approved an Operation in order to deploy AFOR to Albania, with the 
task of assisting the Albanian Government and UNHCR in resolving the refugee crisis. 
Thus, NATO’s first humanitarian operation. Operation Allied Harbour started in
Albania 118
Although such operations have been conducted by civilian organizations 
mostly, both international and non-governmental, in the case of the Kosovo crisis, these 
agencies were unable to cope with the massive flood of refugees into Albania. NATO 
being the only organization quickly able to meet the expanding need, it responded to the 
deteriorating situation by deploying its forces rapidly.
www.tsk.mil.tr.
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Turkey supported this attempt to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
Kosovar deportees. She participated in the Operation Allied Harbour with a field service 
company to help the settlement of the refugees and to heal the wounds caused by this 
humanitarian disaster. Turkish citizens, state and private institutions, and NGOs 
initiated a nation-wide humanitarian aid campaign to heal the wounds of refugees. 
Ankara established a refugee camp in Kirklareli-Turkey and hosted 18.000 Kosovar 
deportees. In addition, it set up two refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania and 
provided shelter for more than 10,000 refugees.
2.5 Operation ALBA
Albania, experiencing the difficulties of transition from communism to a free- 
market economic system, was dragged into a dramatic internal crisis due to the collapse 
of a number of pyramid investment schemes in January 1997. The investors saw their 
life savings disappear, and took to the streets. The situation worsened after the 
Democratic Party (PD) government of president Salih Berisha failed to satisfy them. 
Though the government the told investors that it would start repayment on February 5, it 
was not able to meet the huge demand.
Police and security forces could not stop the uprising and by mid-February 
many areas of the country, especially in the south, fell under the control of rebel groups 
or of local criminals. Several military bases and police stations were attacked and 
hundreds of thousands of weapons were looted. As a result of the widespread chaos and 
anarchy, criminal activities surged, public and private properties were destroyed. On 3 
March, although the government put into practice the state of emergency, it could not
Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, p 13-14.
58
provide security in the country. A large number of Albanians began to flee to 
neighboring countries, particularly to Greece and Italy.
The crisis in Albania, was triggered off by the collapse of investment schemes, 
and did not have any distinctive feature of a civil war. There was not any direct threat to 
the unity of Albania, though there was a risk of the armed groups being politicized or of 
the political parties establishing organic links with them if the widespread anarchy and 
chaos continued. Furthermore, if the crisis went on, there was a risk of the state of 
anarchy remaining constantly and of turning the country into a new Somalia.
Since both Greece and Italy were affected the most by the escalation of the 
crisis, they tried to mobilize Western institutions to take urgent measures for the crisis. 
However, NATO, WEU and OSCE did not want to get involved in the crisis directly. 
NATO Council decided not to contemplate a military operation because of US pressure 
due to her concerns about further entanglement of NATO in the Balkans. The WEU was 
unable to manage an operation, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of 
combat forces in crises management and peacekeeping because of the lack of collective 
solidarity within the A l l i a n c e . A s  the EU countries failed to agree on a WEU 
operation, Italy revealed her initiative to promote the creation of a multinational 
protection force in Albania to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and to the UN Secretary- 
General. Italy announced its willingness to take the lead in the organization and the 
command of the operation.
Permanent Council of the OSCE expressed appreciation for the Italian 
initiative on 27 March, and the UN Security Council authorized OSCE, adopting
Ettore Greco, “Delegated Peacekeeping: The case o f Operation Alba”, 
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resolution 1101, to establish an Italian-lead Multinational Protection Force (MPF) on 28 
March 1997. The mandate of the multinational force was to facilitate the safe and 
prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create secure environment for 
the mission of international Organizations in Albania. Meanwhile, the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1101 defined the situation in Albania as a threat to peace and 
security in the region and activated the potential application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. But the MPF had a limited mandate ruling out any 
role in repressing and disarming the rebel groups.
The troop contributing countries of the MPF were mainly Mediterranean and 
European states, including Greece, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Turkey, and Austria, Denmark and Belgium with slight participation. On 21 May, when 
the deployment was completed, the size of the MPF was amounted to 6,556 personnel. 
The four largest contributors of the MPF were Italy (3068 troops), France (952), Greece 
(802), and Turkey (779). The force reached its maximum size during the election 
process, with the Italian troops increasing to the total to 7,215.
Turkey participated in the Operation ALBA with a Marine Battalion Task 
Force. Turkish contingent was comprised of 759 soldiers selected from specially trained 
marine commandos of the Turkish Navy and 20 officers and NCOs assigned to the 
headquarters a total of 779 personnel from April to August 1997. The Turkish 
contingent was deployed in Tirana and northern part of Albania, and a Turkish major 
general served as a deputy commander of MPF.
During the operation, Turkish contingent deployed in Zallher and Rinas 
Airport, secured the three main routes, namely Tirana-Lac-Lezhe, Tirana-Lac-Burrel- 
Peshkopi and Tirana-Vore by carrying out 96 convoy escorts, 21 road patrols and 85
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VIP escorts through which international humanitarian aid was brought in to the country. 
Turkish battalion executed its duty by travelling hundreds of thousands of kilometers 
without facing any unpleasant encounters in its area of responsibility. The Albanian 
people embraced the Turkish contingent with love and en thus i asm.Turkey  placed 
“Tacan” signal equipment near the Tirana airport to provide better landing and flight 
safety for future flights. In addition, Turkey established a satellite communication center 
near the airport to improve electronic capabilities in Albania.
It contributed to the return of normality in Albania. It established good 
relationship based on mutual confidence and friendship with Albanian Commando 
Brigade and handed over 10.850 uniforms and equipment to Albanian Armed Forces. It 
restored Tirana-Zallherr road, the water canal, the school and the cemetery of Zallherr 
village. Moreover, Turkey donated 150 tons and 9 850 parcels of aid materials, 165 000 
medical supply kits to Albania, treated 1 210 Albanian patients at the camp hospital.
Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, pp 5-6. 
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CHAPTER III
TURKEY’S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL PEACE 
AND SECURITY
3.1 Turkey’s Security Perspective
Turkey’s foreign policy has been shaped by two factors, namely geography 
and historical heritage. Due to her history and geographic position, Turkey is a country 
of Europe, the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Mediterranean, as well as Black Sea. In 
such intermingling junctions, to provide her security Turkey has pursued a security 
policy, which is defensive and active, in compliance with her foreign policy principle of 
“peace at home, and peace in the world”.
With this policy vision, Turkey accepted cooperation and partnership as key 
elements for the success of her security policy. She has shaped her foreign policy 
objectives within the framework of these factors by maintaining friendly relations with 
other countries, promoting regional and international cooperation, resolving conflicts 
through peaceful means, and contributing to regional and international peace, stability 
and prosperity. To achieve these objectives, relations of good neighborliness, non­
expansionism, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, non­
interference in internal affairs and reciprocity have become the guiding principles that 
have helped consolidate Turkey's security.
We can see concrete examples of this policy in Turkey’s foreign and security 
policy from her establishment to the present. In the 1920s, Turkey resolved the
ErgUven?, §adi, “Turkey’s Security Perspective”, Perceptions, www.mfa.gov.tr/groupe/eh/defalt.htm. 
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problems left over from the Lausanne treaty by means of negotiations, and established 
bilateral relations with neighboring countries on the basis of cooperation and mutual 
understanding. In the mid-1930s, as the international environment deteriorated, she 
contributed to regional security cooperation in the multilateral level. She played a 
leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente with Greece, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia in 1934, and the Saadabad Pact with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 
1937.
After World War II, Turkey faced Russian claims of territory and joint control 
of the Straits. This brought her close to NATO.NATO membership and the Cold War 
opened a new phase in Turkey’s security. She took her place with an increased security 
in the world order of the Cold War, on the side of the West. Turkey respected her treaty 
obligations fully and vigorously, and Turkish military had a very important role to play. 
Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense effort was to hold NATO’s 
southern flank against the Soviet threat. She became a reliable and important ally on the 
southern flank, which tied down about 24 Soviet divisions on her borders in the east 
during the Cold War. In this period, the Alliance became cornerstone of Turkey’s 
foreign and security policies.
Apart from her contribution to protection of global balance through NATO, 
Turkey endeavored to promote security in her adjacent regions by employing traditional 
security p o l i c i e s . S h e  took the lead in the establishment of regional security 
cooperation at multilateral level, as she did in the interwar period. She achieved forming 
a security belt on her eastern border with the Balkan Pact of 1954 with Greece and 
Yugoslavia and eastern border with the Baghdad Pact of 1955 with Britain, Iraq, Iran, 
and Pakistan.
63
With the end of the Cold War, a New World order has begun to take its shape 
under the hegemony of the US. With the emergence of this new world order, remarkable 
changes in world politics, including the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which was 
the vital factor for the cohesion of the alliance, and the effects of globalization have 
forced international relations actors to redefine their security and threat perceptions. In 
this process, there had appeared doubts about the strategic importance of Turkey and the 
future role of NATO in the New World order because of the expectations that the new 
security environment will be more secure.
Because of the necessity of defining the multidimensional nature of the 
security problems of new era, debate over different issues, mainly broadening security 
agenda, the issue of securitization and desecuritization and referent object of security 
have emerged in security studies.^^^ As a result, with regard to the changes in the 
security environment, including the changes both in the nature of threat and in the way 
security is conceived, non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, organized crime, 
drug trafficking, ethnic conflicts, the spread of mass destruction have been defined as 
the major security threats of new era. Another remarkable change in the security field 
has been in the way that it has been practiced. Since the impacts of globalization 
enhanced the capabilities of terrorist groups and made this threat more complex to solve 
unilaterally, or the ethnic conflicts in a region have begun to affect other states in 
different regions socially, economically or politically, the security threats of the new era
Turkey’s Security Perspective and Its Relations with NATO”, www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm, 
23 October 2002.
Securitization means moving issues into security agenda through the threat-defense discourse to 
employ emergency measures and extraordinary means. Desecuritization means moving issues out from 
the threat-defense discourse into the ordinary public sphere See for information, Wjever, Ole, 
Securitization and Desecuritization’, in On Security, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed. (NY: Colombia University 
Press, 1995) pp. 46-86, and Bilgin, Pınar, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, ‘Security Studies: The 
Next Stages?’, Naçao e Defensa 84:2 (2000) pp. 55-73. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 
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have increased the necessity of joint action and cooperation at national, transnational 
and international level to be dealt with successfully.
With the end of the Cold War, there have been considerable changes in 
Turkey’s security environment. In the periphery of Turkey including the Balkans, 
Caucasus and Middle East emerged new instabilities and uncertainties due to the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, failed state structure in Iraq, and 
historic grievances in these regions. The security threats of the new era have erupted in 
Turkey’s immediate environment. To clarify the volatile region in which Turkey 
endeavored to ensure her security, it suffices to say that 18 of 19 probable conflict 
scenarios that NATO military authorities have identified for planning purposes would 
require Turkey’s involvement directly or i n d i r e c t l y . U n d e r  these circumstances, 
Turkey, considering that her security rests on the promotion and insurance of the peace 
and stability in her region, decided to give more importance to the military training 
cooperation, partnership for peace program, organizations of multilateral peace force, 
and increase in her contribution to peacekeeping operations. To contribute to the 
promotion of the regional peace and stability in return for consolidating her security, 
she has pursued a multilateral activist policy unless her national security threatened.
Turkey’s peace efforts in the Balkans have all been in the context of 
multilateral activist policy. Turkey’s contributions to peace operation in the region, for 
instance, have been in the context of international organizations, including UN, NATO 
and OSCE. In the same manner, Turkey, believing that the regional problems can only 
be solved by means of regional framework, has launched new regional initiatives.
Morali, Turan, “ Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Perceptions”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 1, 
Number 4 pp. 51-71.
“The Approach of Turkish Armed Forces to Regional Peace ”, www.tsk.mil.tr, 10 March 2003
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MPFSEE and BLACKSEAFOR serving as confidence building measures are two only 
two of the relevant examples.
Another important initiative that Turkey together with other Balkan states has 
initiated is Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), which provides a useful 
and valuable forum for high-level discussion and thought on issues of common 
concern. In addition, she fully participated in other regional initiatives, which stress 
economic integration and cooperation in the Balkans, such as the Stability Pact and the 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Last but not least, believing that 
stability and security in Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained unless the 
South Eastern part of the continent has gotten read of economic or social turmoil, she 
supports the efforts of the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions.* '^*
In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey has also avoided unilateral acts. To 
contribute peace and security in these regions, Turkey has been using Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) as an important instrument for her policies. Within the framework of 
NATO’s partnership of Peace program she has developed bilateral relations with the 
newly independent states over a broad range of military, political, economic and cultural 
issues. Turkey, being a modem, secular, democratic, having western values and 
becoming a country producing security rather than consuming it, has been regarded as a 
model country in the region.
Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has triggered instability and 
insecurity in these regions, it has also provided Turkey with two main opportunities to 
strengthen her security. First, the newly independent states, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Armenia took their place in the flank zone of NATO between Turkey and Russia. 
Second, although it is one of the most serious challenges for the implementation of the
66
CFE treaty, the distribution of military potential of the Soviet Union among the 
republics in the flank zone weakened Russian regional superiority in the conventional 
forces. To promote peace and security through regional cooperation, Turkey proposed 
the establishment of a Stability Pact including all the regional countries, but this became 
abortive because of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey believes that 
the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Caucus will result in political stability and 
economic well being for all, and will open up new prospects for regional cooperation.*^^ 
Turkey’s new initiatives in these regions have assumed economic and political 
dimensions in her bilateral relations. Turkey has proposed important projects; the Baku- 
Ceyhan pipeline project to transfer the oil and gas resources of the region is one to 
mentioning. This important project was accepted and its construction will be completed 
until 2005. In addition, since the US intended to prevent the reemergence of Russia as a 
political and military power in the region and supported the development of the newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union, she supports the policy Turkey has 
pursued towards the region. The US has also supported Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for its 
strategic importance, which prevents domination of Russia in the energy resources of
the Caucasus and Central Asia. 136
In this era, to increase her contribution to regional and global peace and 
stability efforts within the framework of PfP, Turkey established the first PfP Training 
Center in Ankara on 29 June 1988. The Turkish PfP Training Center offers courses and 
seminars with the objective of providing strategic and tactical training to the military
“Relations with the Balkan Region”, www.mfa.gow.tr/groupa/default.htm, 8 March 2003 
“Turkish Foreign Policy”, www.mfa.gow.tr/groupg/gb/ default.htm, 7 March 2003 
F.Stephen Larrabee, “Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimentions and New Challenges”, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/MR1241.chap3.pdf, 15 March or Larrabee, F. Stephen. 
2000. ‘Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges,” in Zalmay 
Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Future offurkish-W estem Relations: Toward a 
Strategic Plan, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Report, pp. 21-51.
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and civilian personnel of Partner countries in accordance with NATO/PfP overall 
concepts, general principles and interoperability objectives. From June to the present, 
90 courses and 2 seminars have been completed. A total of 1770 personnel, 513 of 
whom Turkish personnel attended these courses from 17 NATO, 24 BIO and 4 
Mediterranean dialogue countries. At these courses, besides 486 Turkish personnel 
equipped with NATO and PSO experience, experts/speakers from NATO, 244 guests 
speakers from Partner Nations and other international institutions have been welcomed 
to give lessons, lectures and b r ie f ings . In  addition, to increase efficiency of the 
Turkish PfP Training Center, a Mobile Training Team, consisting of 6 personnel, was 
established. This team has conducted courses on the subject of NATO Orientation and 
Rules of Engagement in Kazakhstan, Kırgızistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Albania and 
Macedonia in 2002. It has been planned that the same team will conduct courses on the 
terrorism and anti-narcotics in Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and
Macedonia in 2003. 138
Besides her endeavors within the context of regional and international 
organizations, Turkey has made bilateral efforts to help consolidate her security. 
Bilaterally, at present, Turkey has concluded, with 41 countries, agreements of 
cooperation on military training, technical and scientific matters as well as defense 
industry, and negotiations with 9 countries to sign similar agreements have been carried 
on. Within the context of military training cooperation agreements, up to present, 12000 
personnel from the friend and allied states’ armed forces have been trained in Turkey. In
“Banş için Ortaklık Eğitim Merkezi (BİOEM) Komutanlığı”, Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi, April 2002 
Number; 372p pp. 135-138. For more information see also, www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/home-yeni.htm. 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/bashalk/bilginotu/2002/bn02.htm.
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the same process, every year, 1200 military personnel from almost 30 states are being 
trained and educated in the military institutions in Turkey/^^
To conclude, Turkey’s security vision and foreign policy instruments and style 
have changed in post-Cold War era. Since the impacts of globalization and the end of 
Cold War on international relations have become so intense that actors have difficulty to 
articulate their interests, this development fostered a climate of regional integration and 
cooperation all over the world, the only way to promote international peace and 
security. To comply with the terms of this new trend, Turkey has reshaped her security 
and foreign policy in the region.
3.2 Turkey’s Contribution to Regional Security Initiatives
3.2.1 Multi-National Peace Force in South-East Europe (MNPFSEE)
In the post-Cold War era, dramatic changes in the security environment have 
challenged South Eastern Europe. The challenges, with which the countries in South 
Eastern Europe are faced, forced them to cooperate in the field of political, security and 
economic and social reconstruction.
In the Balkans, in response to the new security environment, the Defense 
Ministers of South Eastern European countries and US initiated the Southeastern 
Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process in 1996, as a regional cooperation 
mechan i sm ,a imed  at regional security and stability. The SEDM process brings 
together, under the same umbrella, NATO countries as well as Partnership for Peace
nations 141
“Askeri İşbirliği ve Eğitim”, www.tsk.mil.tr
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SEDM being a valuable political and military framework, shaping mentality 
and promoting regional cooperation among Balkan countries has prepared suitable 
conditions for the creation of a Multinational Peace Force in South-East Europe 
(MNPFSEE).
3.2.1 Historical Background
The political basis for the creation of a multinational peace force in the Balkans 
was established at the meeting of Defense Ministers of South Eastern European 
countries and US in Sofia in October 1997. In this meeting, they decided to improve the 
cooperation and coordination among the South-East European PfP countries of Albania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia and NATO countries of Turkey, 
US, Italy and Greece.*'^^
After this meeting, plans for a Balkan deployment force were initiated with a 
Turkish proposal in 1997.*'*^  In the first meeting, held with the participation of military 
officials from Balkan countries including Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and 
Turkey, and officials from the US and Slovenia as observers, parties agreed in principle 
to establish a rapid deployment force. They concluded that the force should be open to 
participation from all countries, and must not be limited to operations in the Balkan
region 144
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In the second meeting held in Bucharest, Romania, the parties worked out the 
details of the force, including, name, size, headquarters and f u n d i n g . I n  the meeting, 
Greece, which sought to recapture the leading role in the process and refused to 
participate in a force established under the initiative of Turkey, agreed to participate in 
the force in p r i nc ip le .She  recognized that it was Turkey's initiative, since she had 
agreed to participate in the Bucharest meeting with the Romanian invitation 
emphasizing that it was Ankara who had initiated the process.
As a result of these efforts, the defense ministers of participating countries 
signed the Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe at the 
meeting of the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministers in Skopje, Macedonia, on 26 
September 1998.*"*^  At the beginning, Slovenia and the US took their place in the 
agreement as observers, and then came in Croatia and Ukraine as observers, too.
This Turkish initiative aimed to contribute to regional security and stability and 
to foster good neighborly relations among the countries in South-Eastern Europe in the 
context of the SEDM process, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the 
spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP). '^*^
With the Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, 
which establishes MPFSEE and guide its activities, the parties ensure that the activities 
of the Force will be consistent with the purposes and the principles of the UN Charter. 
They accept that this initiative is neither directed against any third state nor intended to
‘"'ibid
Hürriyet, 17 April 1998 
Turkish Daily News, April 17, 1998.
Akyiiz, Beyazıt, Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile 
Yakınlaşmada Önemi, İstanbul University, The Institute o f Social Science, İstanbul 1999, 
pp.l07.(Unpublished Master Thesis)
Zorlu, Hilmi Akin, “ The Role of the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) for Military 
Cooperation in the Region and the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) 
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form a military alliance of any form against any country or a group of countries. This is 
a transparent and open initiative to the NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries 
in the region, able and willing to contribute positively, at any later stage. It will be in 
line with and supportive of the PfP programs which aim at im.proving regional 
cooperation and allow essential cooperation within the framework of the UN, NATO,
the OSCE and the WEU 150
Under this force operates an on-call brigade, called the South-Eastern Europe 
Brigade (SEEBRIG), composed of forces assigned by participant countries. The brigade 
headquarter was activated 31 August 1999, in Plovdiv/Bulgaria. Its location rotates for a 
four-year period among four participating countries including Bulgaria, Romania, 
Turkey and Greece sequentially. Upon ratification of the agreement by the participant 
parties, the establishment of the force was declared to UN, OSCE and WEU in
November 1999 151
As for the deployment of the SEEBRIG, there are no self-imposed geographic 
limitations on its use; it can be deployed in the Balkans or other areas. According to its 
concept of operation, it will be used one of the two ways; as part of a larger divisional 
formation in NATO and WEU led operations or autonomously as a self-containing 
theatre formation. Again, as part of a larger divisional formation, it will be available for 
possible employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO-led or WEU-led conflict 
prevention and other peace support operations'^^, including peacekeeping, peace­
making, peace-building and humanitarian operations, but not peace enforcement. It 
could participate in coalition of the willing type international initiatives'^^ as well as
Article 2, http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/multinational.forces.agreement.pdf 
'^' Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, pp 18. 
www.seebrig.pims.org/conceptofop.htm
Book, G. Elizabeth, “Multi-National Brigade Set to Deploy in Balkans”, www.nationaldefense 
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operations in the context of PfP. Autonomously as a self-containing theatre formation; it 
can be employed only for small-scale operations/^"*
3.2.2.2 Composition and Organizational Set-Up
The Brigade is composed of only ground elements. It does not include any 
elements of air or naval services, except for tactical air control parties. In other words, 
the SEEBRIG is an “on-call” land force, supported by elements from other services, 
when and if necessary.
The SEEBRIG comprises a HQ of multinational staff, HQ company and signal 
company provided by the host nation, maneuver units, combat support units and 
multinational combat service support battalion.
The maneuver units of the force include four mechanized infantry battalions, 
composed of 2 or 3 companies, combat support and combat service support units and 
one regiment with three infantry companies, and one reconnaissance company. The 
units, in principle, are self-sufficient.*^^
Combat support units comprise of one self-propelled howitzer battery, one 
engineer platoon and two tactical air control parties. With the signing of the Second 
Additional Protocol by the Defense Ministers, an Engineer Task Force has taken its 
place within the organization of SEEBRIG. The mission of Engineer Task Force is to 
provide the parties with an emergency relief and humanitarian intervention capabilities.
Turkey contributes to the force with a mechanized infantry battalion, one 
reconnaissance company, one artillery battery, one engineering company and some 
combat support and combat service support units. In addition, she will assign one signal
www.seebrig.pims.org/conceptofop.htm
www.isn.ethz.ch/pfpdc/documents/2000/Planning_Symposium_Oberammergau/Zorlu/Word.htm 
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company and one brigade HQ company when the brigade HQ is to be located in Turkey 
between the years 2007-2011. Contributions of other parties are as follows;*^®
Albania : 1 company,
Bulgaria : 1 Battalion,
Italy : 1 regiment,
Macedonia : 1 Battalion,
Greece : 1 Battalion,
Host Nation : HQ company and signal company.
These units will remain at their permanent home base locations and they will 
come together to form the appropriate force for exercises/training activities in 
accordance with jointly prepared programs, and for contingencies should there be a 
decision by the parties to that e f f e c t . O n l y  HQ Company and Signal Company, 
provided by the Host Nation, are located in the same place with the HQ.
According to the Agreement, at the highest level, political and military 
consultation and decision-making is carried out through the meetings of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Defense Staffs and the Politico- 
Military Steering Committee. Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings focus on political 
subjects and political aspects of military operations, while Defense Ministerial meetings 
review military subjects and make decisions and recommendations in issues, such as 
participation in operations, overall guidelines for the employment of the Force, rules of 
engagement (ROEs), approval of contingency operations plans (COPs), and operational 
plans. The meetings of Chiefs of Defense Staffs are advisory for high-level military 
consultation. Meetings of foreign affairs and defense ministers, as well as chiefs of
www.isn.ethz.ch/pfpdc/documents/2000/Planning_Symposium_Oberammergau/Zoriu/Word.htm. 
Akyüz, Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile Yakınlaşmada 
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defense, will occur at least annually.*“  In addition, a Politico-Military Steering 
Committee (PMSC) has been established as the joint executive body to provide 
oversight and policy guidance for deployment, employment and other activities of the 
force.
This steering committee is composed of delegations nominated by the parties. 
It works as a forum for the drafting of policies governing the use of SEED RIG.'“  The 
primary role of PMSC is to provide oversight to ensure conformity and harmony with 
the aims and principles. The PMSC develops policies and guidance for ministerial 
approval in issues, such as annual programs, including exercises and training, troop 
contributions, proposals concerning possible deployments, employment policy, logistic, 
budget, restructuring of the force, relations with similar formations, interoperability and 
standardization. The PMSC is responsible for oversight of performance, manning, 
approval of the Force HQ budget, revision of the terms of reference for the Commander, 
Deputy Commanders and Chief of Staff, and submitting reports for consideration at the 
Ministerial meetings and for the meetings of Chiefs of Defense Staffs. Furthermore, the 
PMSC is charged with approving Contingency Operations Plans (COPs), establishing 
standards for unit training, approving doctrine papers and training documents, and 
establishing joint teams to evaluate readiness levels of units.
The Brigade Command Group shall be composed of the Commander of the 
Brigade, two Deputies, Chief of Staff and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff. An Army 
brigadier general discharges the duties of the Brigade Commander on a two-year basis, 
where a colonel of the Host nation discharges the duties of the Chief of Staff in the
www.isn.ethz.ch/pfpdc/documents/2000/Planning_Symposium_Oberammergau/Zorlu/ Word.htm 
Article 4, http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/multinational.forces.agreement.pdf 
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Brigade. The Brigade Commander has the right to issue orders to subordinate units 
when the SEEBRIG is undergoing joint training, preparing for action in an area of 
operation in which the SEEBRIG is going to participate and for the duration or such an
• 164operation.
Key positions within the force rotate for a two-year period among the parties. 
The Chairmen of PMSC, Brigade Commander, Deputy Brigade Commander, Chief of 
Staff, and Deputy of Chief of Staff are subject to r o t a t i o n .T h e  first Commander of 
the Brigade was a Turkish brigadier-general. He held this position between the years 
1999 and 2001, and Turkey handed it over to Greece. Turkey will take over the 
Chairmanship of PMSM in August 2003.
3.2.1.3 Activities
Although the parties is responsible for the training of their own units in their 
permanent locations, joint training activities and exercises are vital in order to increase 
the effectiveness of the Force. To that end, the preparations in making the brigade 
operational for future missions have started right after the activation. Up to the present, 
the Brigade has planned and conducted 8 training exercise, and participated in 4 
exercises.
The first exercise of the brigade, SEEBRIG-99, was conducted just three 
months after the activation between 1-11 December 1999 as a command post exercise. 
The aim was to improve operational capability through the development of a common 
understanding of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and to enhance interoperability by
training commanders and staff on relating procedures required to conduct PSO 166
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The Brigade conducted its second exercise, Seven Stars-2000, as a field 
exercise, between 17-30 September 2000, in Koren-Haskovo area, Bulgaria. The 
augmented and allocated units participated. In total 1154 personnel, including one 
brigadier general, 266 officers, 145 non-commissioners, 742 soldiers joined in. With 
this exercise, the Brigade aimed to improve operational capability through exercising 
between its HQ and assigned units in the field, to develop a common understanding of 
PSOs and to enhance interoperability between its HQ and units in the field.
In 2001, three different exercises, including Seven Stars-2001, CAX -2001 and 
Cornerstone-2001, were planed and conducted successfully. The exercise of Seven 
Stars-2001, conducted as a multinational brigade level field training exercise with the 
participation of 2065 personnel, used a fictitious peacekeeping operation and 
humanitarian assistance scenario in a country, dragged into a dramatic internal crisis 
due to collapse of state structure. The brigade conducted its first computer aided 
exercise, CAX-2001, between 12-16 March 2001 at the permanent HQ in Plovdiv. The 
exercise, based on a fictitious scenario providing fundamental aspects of peacekeeping 
operation and humanitarian assistance, aimed to increase harmonization among the staff 
to test SEEBRING concepts and to train staff and other personnel for decision-making 
process on the computer environment. Comerstone-2001, an engineer exercise, was 
conducted with the participation of the US Navy Engineer Units between 2 April and 31 
July 2001 in Albania. The aim of this exercise was to improve the humanitarian
167 ibid
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intervention capabilities of Coalition Engineer Task Force and to test their operational 
potential, interoperability and command and control procedures in the field.
In 2002, the brigade increased its activities through both planning and 
conducting exercises by its own capabilities and participating in PfP exercises. It 
conducted Seven Stars-2002, Comerstone-2002 Staff Exercise-2002 and (STAFFEX- 
2002), and participated in Southeastern Europe Simulation Network Demonstration and 
Exercise (SEESIM-2002) and PfP exercises including Southern Star-2002, On Guard- 
2002 and Cooperative Adventure Exchange-2002.
With the Exercise of Seven Stars -  2002, the brigade conducted its second 
command post exercise in Plovdiv, Bulgaria between 20 and 31 May. The theme of the 
exercise was peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. It aimed at improving the 
operational capabilities of SEEBRIG and providing a better understanding of the 
specifics of peace keeping and humanitarian operations. Cornerstone -  2002 was 
conducted as a training exercise of the Engineer Task Force of the brigade between 25 
May and 31 July, in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The command of the exercise was shared with 
the US engineer units under United States European Command (EUCOM). The 
Exercise tried to develop the capacity to carry out humanitarian missions, and 
increasing operational capabilities, interoperability, verify command and control 
procedures .The  Staff Exercise-2002 is a training exercise conducted with the aim of 
training HQ staffs and personnel.
SEEBRIG participated in SEEESIM-2002, conducted under co-chairmanship 
of Greece and the US in December in Athens, as a response cell^’  ^ in order to enhance 
response capabilities of its HQ and units in case of a civil emergency situation in South
www.seebrig.pims.org/exercises.htm
‘’°http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/home.nsf/Toate/nato/$FiIe/nll9.html.
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Europe region.Part icipat ion of the parties in ETF; Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Romania and Albania participate with an engineer company, Italy with a battalion size 
unit supported with combat and combat service support units and Macedonia with a 
platoon.
The CIN is intended to serve as the primary information source and 
communication link between the PMSC, Commander of the SEEBRIG and the 
Parties.'^® The purpose of this project is to provide the participating countries with a low 
cost, high technology, interoperable standard communications and information 
exchange system to be used in crises management.
In addition, the projects of Satellite Interconnection of Military Hospitals 
(SIMIHO) and South Eastern Europe Simulation Network are on the progress.
Last but not least, lack of communication equipment, the greatest obstacle for 
the deployment of SEEBRIG, is about to be overcome. PMSC approved the US-Turkish 
merged CIS project, which will speed preparations for making SEEBRIG deployable. 
Since the brigade was declared as operationally ready on the 1'^ ' of May 2001, and it still 
awaits completion of this project*’ ,^ it is believed that the US-Turkish Merged CIS 
Project is critical for SEEBRIG’s deployment and other parties contribute funds and 
equipment to this project. For example, Macedonia donates 40.000 USD and Italy’s 
offer of free use of a military satellite when needed by COMSEEBRIG.'^°
ibid, pp.22
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3.2.2 Black Sea Force
The post-Cold War era, eliminating the ideological divide in the Black Sea 
region, has offered new opportunities for the promotion of co-operation and joint action 
between Black Sea countries. Regional countries, including Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaiia, 
Romania, Georgia and Russia, have initiated talks on confidence-building measures in 
two separate processes in late 1998 to make better use of the opportunities of new era. 
One is the implementation of confidence-building measures in the Black Sea, which 
include arms talks, and the other is the establishment of the on-call forces in the spirit of 
PfP known as Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR), involving all countries in the 
region.'^' In this process, although Kiev is insistent that the talks aimed at strengthening 
confidence on the Black Sea were initiated by Ukraine, the Turkish General Staff has 
become the first to announce the necessity of forming a joint naval force in the Black
Sea. 182
BLACKSEAFOR, which is a tangible product of Turkey’s peace efforts in the 
region, has aimed to further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual 
understanding in the Black Sea region through enhancement of cooperation and 
interoperability among the naval forces of the littoral countries. It has a special 
importance because it is the first formation of such political significance in the Black 
Sea with the participation of all the littoral states, which belonged to the rival military 
alliances: Turkey was a member of NATO; the other countries were in the Warsaw Pact 
during the Cold War era.
John Pike, “Black Sea Fleet”, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mf-black.htm, 17 January 
2003
Serhiy ZGURETS, “Black Sea Countries Want Black Sea Force”, the Day, December 14 1999, 
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3.2.2.1 Historical Background
The idea of formation of a multinational naval peace task force, namely 
BLACKSEAFOR, through participation of all littoral states to enhance peace and 
stability and to improve good relationship in the Black Sea region has been tabled at the 
second chiefs of the Black Sea navies (CBSN) meeting which was held in Varna / 
Bulgaria in 1998. All littoral states declared that they approved the idea, and then efforts 
under the lead of Turkey to establish the BLACKSEAFOR were made with the 
meetings of experts including diplomats, naval officers and legal authorities of the black 
sea httoral states.'*"  ^ Through these meetings, BLACKSEAFOR establishment 
agreement and other necessary documents were prepared under the chairmanship of a 
Turkish admiral.
As a result of the negotiations, lasting more than three years, all littoral 
states have agreed on all the provisions of the Agreement on the Establishment of Black 
Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group, BLACKSEAFOR. Thus, all the littoral states 
signed this agreement in the ^iragan Palace in Istanbul on 2 April 2001. The signing of 
the BLACKSEAFOR Establishment Agreement has been the most important milestone 
of this initiative because it revealed signatories’ determination to bring the 
BLACKSEAFOR into life after the successful conclusion of negotiation process. 
With this agreement, all the littoral states came together for the first time in the history 
of the region to estabhsh a joint formation as a multinational naval peace task force for
Turkey’s Security Perspective and Its Relations with NATO”, www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm, 
23 October 2002.
http://www.blackseafor.org
185 ibid .
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fulfilling joint tasks ranging from humanitarian rescue operations to any other task that 
can be jointly decided upon in the future.
The BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, aims at fostering peace and stability in the 
Black Sea as weU as promoting regional co-operation and interoperability among the 
naval forces of these states. By signing the BLACKSEAFOR agreement, the signatories 
also confumed that their main purpose is to contribute to the further strengthening of 
regional security, friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black 
Sea littoral states.'*^
Since the activation has required that the establishment agreement should be 
ratified by the parliament of at least four littoral states, signatories quickened their 
national procedures concerning the ships participation and the endorsement of the 
agreement. Turkey completed national procedures on June 26, 2001 by the approval of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly.'** Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania completed the 
approval of the agreement by their parliaments; the other member states including 
Russia and Ukraine are continuing their efforts to complete formal procedures. 
Nonetheless, allocation of ships to the force is provisionally available. **^
BLACKSEAFOR Establishment Agreement is the most important 
milestone, which shapes the activities of the BLACKSEAFOR. The agreement consists 
of general principles, tasks, force structure, political and military aspects, command and 
control, and administration of the force. Within the framework of the establishment 
agreement, tasks of the BLACKSEA are followings:
Morali, Turan, “ Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Perceptions”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 1, 
Number 4 pp. 51-71.
Ulusoy, Hasan, “A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR”, Perceptions, December 
2001- February 2002, vol.VI Num. 4., www.mfa.gow.tr., 12 November 2002.
Hürriyet, 26 June 2001
See Background of BLACKSEAFOR, http://www.blackseafor.org , 29 November 2002.
Turkish Anned Forces Contribution to World Peace, pp 24-25.
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• Search and rescue,
• Humanitarian Assistance,
• Mine counter measures,
• Environmental protection,
• Goodwill visits,
• Any other tasks, like peace support operations agreed by aU the parties.
According to the Establishment Agreement, operational area of the
BLACKSEAFOR is the Black Sea. However, if required, it could be deployed 
elsewhere, should the parties so choose by consensus. Although the BLACKSEAFOR is 
a stand-alone formation, it may also be available for employment in the operations under 
UN or OSCE mandates. It may participate in other international activities in conformity 
with its aims and tasks. The parties shall approve their participation in BLACKSEAFOR 
for such activities in accordance with their national legislation and will complete all 
official procedures required by the UN or the OSCE regulations.
The BLACKSEAFOR was brought into life, through Establishment 
Agreement, as a transparent and a stand-alone initiative, not taking shape within the 
framework of PfP. It is open to other states desiring to contribute positively its peace 
efforts. The decision of accepting new members and their status of membership will be
decided upon through consensus by the parties. 192
3.2.2.2 Composition and Organizational Set-Up
The BLACKSEAFOR is composed of only naval elements; there is no 
direct participation of air or land services in its composition. However, it can be
Article 7, http://www.blackseafor.org , 29 November 2002. 
Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace, pp 24-25.
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supported by elements of other services if necessary. The BLACKSEAFOR is made up 
of four to six ships, one from every participating country, including the one command 
and control ship. Main types of the warships to be assigned to the force are;'^^
• Frigate/destroyer,
• Corvette/patrol boat,
• Mine counter measures ship,
• Amphibious ship,
• Auxiliary ship and vessel.
Parties, according to the needs of the operational program, could allocate 
other types of naval vessels and helicopters to the force. As an on-call force, ships 
allocated to the force remain at their permanent bases during non-activation periods, and 
they come together to form an appropriate force for exercise/training activities in 
accordance with jointly prepared programs by the planning group (PG) meeting.
The overall organizational set-up and naval command and control 
structure during the activation of the BLACKSEAFOR, which is arranged with the 
Establishment Agreement, is as follows.
According to the Establishment Agreement, at the highest level, political 
decisions are taken through the meetings of foreign or defense ministers, or their 
authorized representatives. They, in principle, meet annually and/or in response to a 
party’s invitation. They focus on political aspects of BLACKSEAFOR and provide 
overall political guidance to the BSNC.
Article 5, http://www.blackseafor.org , 29 November 2002, and Serhiy ZGURETS, “Black Sea 
Countries Want Black Sea Force”, the Day, December 14 1999, www.day.kiev.ua, 10 January 2003. 
Article 5
Article 6, Political and Military Consultation and Decision Making, Article 8 Command and Control, 
Article 9 COMBLACKSEAFOR and Staff, http://www.blackseafor.org , 29 November 2002
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The BSNC is an executive body. It is composed of the parties’ naval chiefs or 
Black Sea fleet commanders. The BSNC’s main task is to provide the 
COMBLACKSEAFOR with guidance and to supervise the scheduling and activities of 
BLACKSEAFOR. This committee is charged with deciding on general planning, co­
ordination and execution of activities. In addition to these responsibilities, the BSNC 
will approve the appointment of the COMBLACKSEAFOR and report annually to the 
Parties’ foreign or defense ministers and chiefs of general staff about developments in 
the Black Sea context.
As for command and control structure of the BLACKSEAFOR, while it is 
under the command of the BSNC operationally, it operates under the tactical command 
of its own commander. The BSNC delegates operational control (OPCON) of the force 
to a flag officer named as OPBLACKSEAFOR, and the same party as the commander 
of the BLACKSEAFOR (COMBLACKSEAFOR) designates this officer. In other 
words, during an activation period, the same party holds both positions. In the first year, 
the OPBLACKSEAFOR was from Turkey. This post also rotates among the parties 
together with the COMBLACKSEAFOR.
The commander of the BLACKSEAFOR is a naval officer of the rank of Rear 
Admiral or Captain from the designated Party approved by the BSNC. The 
COMBLACKSEAFOR is normally appointed for a period of one year. The first 
COMBLACKSEAFOR was a Turkish admiral and successive commander is from 
Ukraine since this position rotates in Enghsh alphabetical order among the parties. The 
COMBLACKSEAFOR is directly responsible to the OPBLACKSEAFOR. It 
commands an international staff composed of officers from the Parties. The party that 
hands over the command of COMBLACKSEAFOR takes over appoints the
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commander’s Chief of Staff, COSBLACKSEAFOR.
3.3.3 Activities
The first activation period of BLACKSEAFOR, which was conducted between 27 
September and 16 October, began with a ceremony in Gölcük Naval Base on 27 
September in 2001. During the first activation period, a liaison officer from each 
participating party served under the operational control of the OPBLACKSEAFOR, its 
headquarter was established at the Turkish Naval Forces in Ankara.
All the parties participated in the first activation. The ships that the parties sent
in are as follows; 196
• Teg Fatih (F-242) /Frigate-Turkey
• Bgs Smeli (11) /Frigate-Bulgaria
• Geo Kutaisi (202) / Patrol Boat-Georgia
• Ron Radm.H.MaceUariu (265) / Corvette-Romania
• Ups Cherkasy (U-311) / Mine Sweeper-Ukraine
• Rfs Zheleznyakov (901) /Mine Hunter-Russian Federation
During the first activation, BLKACKSEAFOR executed a port visit program 
visiting these ports; 23-28 September Gdlcuk/Turkey, 29-30 September Varna/Bulgaria, 
02-03 October Constanta/Romania, 05-06 October Odessa/Ukraine, 10-11 October 
Novorossiysk/Russia, 14-15 October Poti/Georgia.
During the port visits; shore training period, pre-sail conference and return 
call/luncheon, force reception, press conference onboard the flagship, sports 
competitions with local teams, and guided tours have been organized. During the sea 
transits, search and rescue, tactical manoeuvres as well as screen, communications, and
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damage control exercises were conducted successfully within the context of sea
• · 197framing.
Following the first activation period, which was conducted under the lead of 
Turkey, Turkey handed over tactical command of the BLACKSEAFOR to Ukraine with 
a change of command ceremony on 8 August 2002.
The second activation period executed, 5-28 August 2002, in accordance with 
the issues pertaining to the second activation discussed during the BSNC meeting took 
place in Yalta/Ukraine on 18 April and the planning group (PG) meeting, held on 13-14 
February in Sevastopol/Ukraine. During the activation period, mine sweeping operation, 
search and rescue, as well as seamanship exercises were conducted as sea training, and 
the ships visited Sevastopol, Ereğli, Constanta and Varna ports. Turkey participated in 
the second activation with a minesweeper, TCG Erdemli.'
3.2.3 Confidence and Security Building Measures Regime in the Black Sea
Turkey, realising the significance of CSBMs and believing that the starting of 
a CSBMs process m the Black Sea region would provide an important contribution to 
the joint efforts in transforming the region into a stable area, actively participated in the 
preparations for a CSBMs regulation in the maritime field of activities among the Black
Sea countries. 199
The talks on the confidence building measures in the Black Sea started with a 
Ukrainian proposal on economic cooperation as a political initiative in the BSEC 
framework in 1994. This proposal requested that the countries pledge not to allow thek 
territory to be used for aggression or subversive activity against another BSEC state, to
see Background of BLACKSEAFOR, http:// www.blackseafor.org , 29 November 2002 
ib id ,, 29 November 2002
198' Hürriyet, 1 August 2002.
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oificially recognize the inviolability of borders and to start the implementation of 
concrete measures in the Black Sea region, including the limitation of naval activity. At 
this stage, this proposal was met with little support due to the complicated situation in 
Moldova and the Caucuses. However, talks on this initiative lasted, and it was 
transformed into a general “declaration” on confidence measures in the Black Sea 
region.^°° In February 1998, as a result of the talks lasting since 1995, the six littoral 
states of Black Sea, namely Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia, 
signed the document of guidelines, which_ is politically binding and reveals the
determination of parties for cooperation, and began to negotiate the provisions that will
201be fundamental for the regime.
In the negotiation process, there appeared disagreements on the issues of the 
zone of application, content of the regime and third countries conducting naval activities 
in the Black Sea. Although Russia, with a view to limiting NATO’s naval activity in the 
Black Sea, desired the third countries to be included in the content of the regime, other 
parties, in particular, Turkey rejected this. In addition, the US particularly being uneasy 
over the possibility of Russian attempts to use the measures as a means to restrict her 
naval freedom in the Black Sea attempted to shape the policy of regional states, namely 
Bulgaria and Romania, in accordance with her own policy. Romania and Bulgaria, 
under the effect of the US policy, made the negotiation process problematical and 
difficult to reach a conclusion.
From very beginning to the end of negotiation process, Turkey, pursuing a 
constructive and decisive position, played an important role in the shaping of the 
confidence and security-building regime and in the negotiation process reaching a
Black Sea, www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p2c4.pdf
Buyiikakmci, Erhan ,“Security Issues and Patterns of Cooperation in the Black Sea Region”, 
www.Bsarg.Crimeainfo.com.
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conclusion. Against Russian persistence on the issue of third countries and the positions 
of Bulgaria and Romania that are problematic due to the American position, Turkey 
acted as a conciliator among these states and she has become a balancing actor during 
the negotiation process.
As a result, the experts of the parties reached an agreement on all the 
provisions of the regime in the negotiations in Vienna in November 2001. Then, on 25 
April 2002, a document on confidence- and security-building measures in the naval 
field in the Black Sea, which is politically binding and can be further enriched with 
measures aimed at contributing to enhancing regional security and stability and 
fostering good neighbourly relations and co-operation, was adopted at the BSEC 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Kiev. At the meeting, it was accepted that this 
document would come into force on January 1, 2003.
According to the approved document, the basic provisions of the confidence
and security-building regime in the Black Sea are foUowings;^°^
• Co-operation in the naval field; including establishing appropriate 
communication channels between the Navy Commanders of the Participating States, 
exchange of navigation, information on ecological problems and conducting mutual 
exercises as well as joint training in this field, avoiding actions which may be seen as 
threatening and posing risk for the ships or personnel of the other participating states, 
co-operation in combating terrorism and exploring ways to further develop co-operation 
in the field of search and rescue.
• Contacts in the naval field; including exchange of visits between naval 
experts and officers at all levels, contacts between relevant naval institutions, invitations
Anadolu Agency, February 26, 1998.
“°· Press release, “Document on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the 
Black Sea http://web.ttnet.net.tr/users/ukremb/press_release/2002-6.rtf,
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ot ships to ports or naval bases or auxiliary naval bases of the Participating States and 
exchange programs for naval officers and petty officers.
• Invitations to naval bases; each participating state will invite every six 
years representatives of all other Paidicipating States to one of its naval bases within the 
zone of application in order to familiarise with its functions and activities.
• Exchange of naval information; the participating states will exchange 
information on number of combat ships, submarines and peacetime authorized naval 
personnel strength that they have deployed within the zone of application.
• Confidence Annual Naval Exercise; each participating state, on the basis 
of annual rotation in English alphabetical order, will designate one of her national naval 
exercises as Confidence Annual Naval Exercise (CANE) and will invite naval 
representatives and units from aU other Participating States.
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CHAPTER IV
TURKEY’S MILITARY EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
4.1 Bilateral Relations with the Regional States in the Field of 
Security
In the new security architecture, general aspiration for a new security system 
based on cooperation gave a fresh impetus to confidence and security building measures 
(CSBM) and disarmament efforts. Turkey regards confidence and security building 
measures and disarmament processes as the important tools for establishing security and 
stability at the bilateral and regional levels^°  ^and attaches them particular importance.
CSBM, the basic principles of which had been accepted at conference held in 
Helsinki in 1975 and have been improved progressively under the name of Vienna 
Document,^®'  ^ aims to contribute to reducing the possibility of armed conflict and of 
misunderstanding of military activities. Thus, CSBMs help to build mutual confidence 
by creating military transparency. The Vienna Document that was adopted in 1990 
embodied the first generation of CSBMs. The CSBMs in the Vienna Document were 
reviewed in 1992 and 1994, and the latest version of the Document was adopted during 
the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit ini999, in order to update them in the face of new
conditions evolving in the OSCE area.205
203 “ q ’ u r ] ^ e y ’ s  Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament”, www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/01.htm
204 “Yjenna Document”, www.tsk.mil.tr.
204 ‘Turkey’s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament”, www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/01.htm, and see 
also “Arms Control and Disarmament”, www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics /issuesarms.htm  
“Vienna Document”, www.tsk.mil.tr
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Application of CSBMs has made great contributions to security in three
ways.“°^  First one is the establishment of transparency by exchange of information and 
annual activity calendar. Second way is the application of the prior notification and 
observation of certain military activities dispels concerns. Third one is the employment 
of the inspections for the establishment of security in Europe.
As an indication of the importance she attaches to regional security 
cooperation, Turkey, other than the bilateral agreements she signed with the Balkan 
countries on issues of good-neighborliness, played a leading role for the realization of 
bilateral confidence and security-building made bilateral CSBM arrangements with her 
neighbours in the Balkans including Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia.^°^
The most striking and successful example to the bilateral CSBM arrangements 
in the Balkans has been with Bulgaria. The "Sofia Document" on confidence and 
security-building measures between Turkey and Bulgaria initiated the first step taken in 
this direction. The two states’ Chiefs of the General Staffs signed the Sofia Document in 
December 1991 and it was designed to strengthen security and confidence along the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border. According to the Sofia Document, two states agreed to an 
advance notice of major military activities taking place between 60 kms of their 
common borders and to permit military observers from either side to monitor 
manoeuvres involving more than 12.000 troops, 300 tanks and 250 artillery pieces in 
that area. The Turkish Chief of General Staff, Doğan Güreş, in his assessment of the 
document, stated that signing the document was a step forward in the relations, and that
“Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States Report of the Secretary-General”, 
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-412.htm.
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it would contribute to peace and stability in the region.'®* He added, “We have smashed 
the steel chains between Turkey and Bulgaria. The rest is easy.” Bulgarian Defense 
Minister Dimitriv disclosed Bulgarian approach toward Turkey saying that Turkey was 
not an opponent country any longer.^ ®® In July 1992, as a part of the confidence- 
building effort, Turkey redeployed one battalion of ground forces and a tank battalion 
from the Bulgarian-Turkish border to the area of Lüleburgaz and Istanbul in a ceremony 
with the participation of Bulgarian Chiefs of the General Staffs."'®
In November 1992, the two states signed the Edirne Document, which 
broadened the scope of the military transparency provided by the Sofia Document with 
additional confidence-building measures.^" In other words, the Edirne Document 
supplements the Sofia Document in the sense that lowers the threshold for the reciprocal 
exchange of notification and observation to military manoeuvres.
According to the Edirne Document, Bulgaria and Turkey will cooperate in the 
area of their common border as well as step up exchange of military information and 
observers. The agreement foresees that each party wiU notify the other in advance of 
military activities involving at least 7,000 troops, 150 battle tanks, or 150 heavy artillery 
pieces. The agreement, which has elaborated the Sofia Document of 1991, came into 
force on 1 January 1993.^'^ Within the context of these SCBMs agreements with 
Bulgaria, up to present, both parties have conducted 8 inspection/evaluation visits
Reuters, December 20, 1991, in Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun^ The Exernlary Relationship in the Balkans: 
Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Cold War era, Bilkent University Institute of Economic and 
Social Sciences, Ankara, August 1999.
°^’Perry, Duncan M., “ New Directions for Bulgarian-Turkish elations”, RFE/RL Digital Text Archive in 
Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun^ The Exemlary Relationship in the Balkans: Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the 
Post-Cold War era, Bilkent University Institute of Economic and Social Sciences, Ankara, August 1999.
Özgür, Nurcan, ‘1989 Sonrası Türkiye-Bulgar İlişkileri’, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, Faruk 
Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp.345-383.
Sezer,Duygu Bazoğlu, “Turkish Security in the Shifting Balkans: Reorientation to a Regional Focus”, 
in Common Security Regimes in the Balkans, ed. Kosta Tsipis Colombia University Press, New York, 
1996 pp.95-138.
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mutually in each country.^'^ As a result, Turkish-Bulgarian confidence-building regime, 
together with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, Cooperation and 
Security concluded on May 6, 1992, eliminating an important degree of mutual 
suspicions and mistrust, have altered threat perceptions of both sides and has also 
brought a new sprit of mutual confidence to bilateral relations.“''^
Turkey has initiated a process with some neighbour countries with the aim of 
establishing of regimes for freeing the common borders from anti-personnel mines 
(APMs) and preventing their use in border areas in future. To this end, Turkey has taken 
the first successful result in her contacts with Bulgaria.^'^ In March 1999, Turkey and 
Bulgaria signed the agreement that stipulates the prevention of using APMs and 
removal of them in the regions next to the common Bulgarian-Turkish border. The 
Turkish Grand National Assembly approved this agreement in December 1999, and it 
came into force in May 2002.
In addition, Turkey and Bulgaria, together with Romania, signed an agreement 
for jointly combating against terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, drug 
trafficking and human and arms smuggling, as well as other major crimes in 1998. The 
agreement includes intensive judicial and technical cooperation between the police 
organizations of the parties.
Turkey concluded a similar agreement on the issues of SCBMs with Albania 
on 6 February 1995. The two states’ Chiefs of the General Staffs signed the Tirana 
Document on Mutually Complementary CSBMs and Military Contacts. According to 
the Tirana Document, parties will invite mutually observers, at least twice a year, to the
Engelbrekt, Kjell, “Bulgaria, Turkey signs military agreement”, www.naukanet.org 
/friends/news/omri/1992/11/ 921120.html
“Vienna Document”, www.tsk.mil.tr
214 ibid. Sezer
“Arms Control and Disarmament”, www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics /issuesarms.htm
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two states’ major military exercises and they will promote and facilitate contacts 
between relevant institutions, including visits at flag and staff officer levels; naval 
visits; joint exercises; exchange of personnel and exchange of visits."'^
Albania being weak and lacking a sufficient military capability has 
experienced two crises and faced security threats from its neighbours within the last 
decade. Turkey has supported Albania firmly in each situation. She participated in 
Operation ALBA, Operation Allied Harbour and she advocated the integrity and 
security of Abanian borders upon Serbian forces crossing Abanian border and entering 
into 200 metres in April 1999.
Macedonia is the third country with which Turkey has concluded a bilateral 
CSBM arrangement. The document, named as Skopje Document, on mutually 
complementary confidence and security building measures between the two countries 
was approved by Turkey's and Macedonia’s Chief of the General Staff in Skopje in July 
1995. According to a statement released by the Turkish General Staff, the Skopje 
Document represents another dimension of the close relations and cooperation between 
the two countries and will enhance transparency and be an instrument in exchanging 
experience in the military security field. The statement stresses that the Skopje 
Document being a clear indication of the willingness of Turkey and Macedonia will
7 1 8
contribute to the stability and security of the Balkans and the OSCE area as a whole.“
The Skopje Document regards conducting activities including visits of 
observers of the military exercises, military contacts between the two armies, training of
Turkish Daily News, April 17, 1998. 
www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/tsakonas.pdf
218 Turkey And Macedonia Adopt Military Security, Confidence Document, www.Turkey.org/news
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Macedonian military personnel at the academies in Turkey, exchange of personnel and 
military units.
In his speech, Ismail Karadayi, Turkey’s Chief of General Staff said that this 
was not going to be a document against the security of third countries, but a document 
for building up the stability of the Balkans. Dragoljub Bocinov, Macedonian Chief of 
General Staff, also pointed out that this document was of great significance for 
Macedonia because it was getting Macedonia closer to the systems of the collective 
security in Europe. He considered this document opened the door for Macedonia to
become a member of NATO 220
The Skopje Document came into effect in August 1995. It provides for 
observation visits to military activities and military contacts, including exchange of 
personnel, between Turkey and Macedonia.
Owing to the principle of indivisibility of security, these arrangements have 
a positive impact on confidence and security not only in the region, but also in the 
OSCE. All of the documents, adopted bilaterally, have been prepared within the 
framework of the OSCE and on the basis of adjusting the Vienna Document on 
confidence- and security-building measures to regional needs. The realisation of 
bilateral arrangements between Turkey and Bulgaria for the first time in 1990 has been 
a model for other OSCE countries. After the adoption of Sofia Document by Turkey and 
Bulgaria, other Balkan Countries made similar arrangements. During the considerations 
for the Vienna Document, upon various proposals inspired by the process initiated with 
measures established between Bulgaria and Turkey, the issue of bilateral CSBMs was 
referred to in the Vienna Document. Article 136 of the Document encourages the OSCE
Turkish Daily News, 1 July 1997.
“Conribution for stable Balkans”, w\vw.hri.org/news/agencies/mic/95-07-2l.mic.html.
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countries to develop transparency and confidence building through bilateral, multilateral 
or regional arrangements.·“'
Last but not least, to enhance stability and security in the Balkans, Turkey has 
supported NATO enlargement process to include the region. Turkey assesses the 
enlargement process as part of the EU integration^'“ and advocates that the expansion of 
NATO should not end until all the Southeastern European Countries have entered 
NATO.^^^ To that end, Turkey advocated Bulgaria and Romania’s entry. Since Turkey 
had the second military capability and an influence in NATO, regional countries 
wishing to be a member of NATO seek Turkey’s support and approach Turkey in 
defense and security issues. In other words, NATO with its enlargement process and 
PfP program has presented a firm basis for cooperation between Turkey and the 
regional states. In this connection, Turkey inaugurated her PfP Center in Ankara on 29 
June 1998 to enhance her efforts to help the partner states^ '^' and concluded a number of 
military training and cooperation agreement to contribute regional states reach NATO’s 
interoperability standards by providing educational and training support.
4.2 Enhanced Military Relations 
4.2.1 Albania
Enhanced military relations between Turkey and Albania started in the 
beginning of the 1990s. In 1992, two states signed three agreements including the 
agreements of Friendship and Cooperation in June, Defense Cooperation Pact in July
“Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States Report of the Secretary-General”, 
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-412.htm
■·■ Turkish Defense Mininster Sabahatin Çakmakoğlu’s statement in the meeting o f four Balkans states, 
including Turkey, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, www.trncwashdc.org/news.
President Sezer’s Statement in the trio summit hold in Çeşme with Bulgaia and Romania, Turkish 
Daily News May 15, 2002, President Sezer’s Statement in the trio summit hold in Çeşme with Bulgaia 
and Romania.
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and Defense Technology and Military Training Cooperation in November, to rests their 
bilateral relations on a strong b a s i s . Wh Ue  the Agreement of Defense Cooperation 
Pact specifies bilateral cooperation in the production of military and technical 
equipment and the training of Albanian personnel in Turkey,^“® the Agreement on 
Defense Technology and Military Training Cooperation stipulated training of Albanian 
officers, exchange programs, joint manoeuvres, and aid for the Albanian army.^^  ^
Hence, the political basis of close military relations between Turkey and Albania has 
been established.
To improve close military relations, both states have made a significant 
number of high-level mihtary visits to each other up to present. The first significant 
visit, at the ministerial level, came from Albanian Defense Minister in June 1992. 
During his visit to Turkey, two states signed the agreement on defense cooperation, 
namely Defense Cooperation Pact, and Albanian Defense Minister visited Turkish 
military facilities. The Turkish Naval Vessel, Fevzi Çakmak, visited the Albanian port 
of Drac on August 28, 1992, for the first time since the days of late Ottoman Empire. 
The first visit from Turkey to Albanian Ministry of the Defense was made by a military 
delegation in November 1992,^^  ^ and two states signed the Agreement on Defense 
Technology and Military Training Cooperation during this visit.
Both parties, seeing their mutual military visits as an indicator of dynamic and 
evolving process of their close military relations have given great importance to these
Turkish Anned Forces Contribution to World Peace, pp 13.
Demirtaş-Coşkun, Birgiil, “Arnavutluk’un Dış Politikası ve Balkanlar’da Arnavutluk Sorunu”, Balkan 
Diplomasisi, Ömer E. LUtem-Birgül Deınirtaş-Çoşkun, ASAM Yayınlan, Balkan Araştırma Dizisi;3, 
Ankara, 2001 pp. 87.
Karaosınanoğlu, Ali L., Crises in the Balkans, United Nations Publication, New York, 1993, pp. 17. 
and Harp Akademilari Komutanlığı, Balkanlar ve Türkiye’nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikalan Sempozyumu, 
Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, İstanbul, 1999, pp.205.
Biberaj, Elez, Albania in Transition, Western Presss, Colorado, 1998, pp.231, and Harp Akademilari 
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visits, and have made many military visits to each other in the recent years. In this 
context, Albanian high-level military visits have been conducted by Albanian Defense 
Minister in both 1997 and 1999, Albanian Chief of General Staff, Albanian Deputy 
Chief of General Staff, Albanian Chief of Naval Forces in 1998 and 2001, a Delegation 
of Defense CoUage and Albanian Defense Minister together with the Chiefs of Land, 
Naval and Air Forces. In the same way. Chief of Naval Forces in 1998 and 2001, 
Defense Minister, and Chiefs of Logistical, Health and Finance Departments of General 
Staff have made Turkish high-level militaiy visits to Albania.
These high-level visits have been coupled with Turkey’s contribution to 
training and modernisation of Albanian Army. Turkey has by now provided education 
and training of Albanian Army both in Albania and Turkey. In the context of mutual 
training and education and exchange of personnel programs, following education and 
training activities conducted in Turkey.
From 1991 to 2001, 840 Albanian military personnel completed their 
educations in the military education institutions in Turkey. In 2002-2003, 5 personnel 
for Military Staff CoUegies, 20 personnel for Gulhane Military Medical Academy, 47 
personnel for Military Academies, 50 personnel for Military High Schools, 17 personnel 
for Branch Schools, 9 personnel for Language School, in total 148 Albanian military 
personnel is being educated in these military institutions.
In addition, Albanian military personnel have been given different courses in 
Turkey. 26 Albanian generals and officers were offered a course, lasting 3 weeks, theme 
of which were the study techniques in the headquarters. 122 Albanian military 
personnel have participated in the courses given by Turkish PfP Center. 67 personnel of 
Albanian Navy participated in open sea training given by Turkish Navy.
‘T he Turkish Connection”, www.antiwar.com/orig/dakovic2.html
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As for the activities in Albania, Turkey contributed to the reorganisation and 
training of some units and modernisation of some military institutions. In 1996, 14 
Turkish military personnel gave offered courses to Albanian officers on the 
establishment of a commando battalion as well as its training and trained officers and 
non-commissioned officers of two commando regiments in Albania. In the same year, a 
group of Turkish military personnel, consisting of 1 general, 14 officers and 3 civilian 
officials assisted to reorganisation of Albanian Chief of General Staff.
A training group, namely Turkish Organization and Training Team, has been 
in Albania to establish and train Albanian Commando Brigade since 1997. Turkey has 
been providing all of the equipment as well as main requirements including vehicle and 
communication materials of this brigade. At the moment, this commando brigade is the 
only unit that is operationally ready and deployable in Albania. Until now, the team has 
trained 31 officers, 32 NCOs and 4387 soldiers, and training of 131 officers, 137 NCOs 
and 851 soldiers is going on.
Upon Albanian request for the training of the Unit of Republic Guards by 
Turkey, the training of this unit has begun under the command of General Staff Special 
Forces in 1999. At the first stage, 17 Albanian military personnel, at the leader level, 
were trained for a 10-week period in Turkey. The training of this unit has been going on 
in Albania under command of a team. So far, 77 officers and 117 NCOs have been 
trained and the training of 5 officers and 46 NCOs is going on. Turkey has also been 
providing vehicles and communication equipment for this unit.
Another unit that Turkey trained in Albania is the Albanian Special Forces 
Battalion. Turkish military advisers, from Special Forces, established the battalion and 
started its training in 1999. This battalion became operationally ready after the training
Balkanlar ve Türkiye’nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikaları Sempozyumu, pp.206.
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of its personnel was completed. In the same way, as Turkey has provided main 
equipment of the units she trained, she has been supplying some of the main equipment 
of this battalion.
As for exercises, Turkey and Albania have participated in a significant number 
of PfP exercises and SEEBRIG exercises together with their units or observers. 
MAREX 95-2 was an example of these exercises. It was a joint naval exercises 
conducted off the Albania coast under the umbrella of PfP program with the 
participation of one Turkish destroyer and six Albanian vessels. A statement by the 
Albanian Defense Minister spokesman said that the missions of the exercises were 
mainly searched and rescue. It stated that Albania and Turkey had already conducted 2 
exercises in 1995.^^° Besides PfP exercises, Turkey assists Albania in the planning and 
conducting process of her national exercises. For instance, Turkey helped Albania in the 
planning and conducting procedures of Albania Plan Exercises in 1995.
Another activity conducted in Albania is the opening of a Turkish language 
classroom and laboratory in Albanian Army War Academy with the participation of 
Albanian Deputy of Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff in 25 September 2000. 
The officers started to take the course of basic Turkish language. 2 Albanian officers 
educated in Turkey offer it. In addition, Albanian officials desire giving Turkish 
language course in their Naval War Academy.
Other than training and education activities, Turkey has been contributing to 
the reconstruction of some military institutions. Turkey has reconstructed and 
modernised Albanian Naval War Academy and the naval base of Pashaliman. The 
Academy was opened with a ceremony in October 2000. Pashaliman Port was 
submitted to Albania in January 2001. Besides, Turkey reconstructed and established a
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Training Center within the framework of Vlora project after she had completed its 
modernisation projects. After completing this modernisation project, it conducted the 
reactivation of this center and first training activity. Turkey has by now spent a lot for 
these modernisation activities and it is expected to increase its budget by about 80 
million dollars in total in 2004.
Turkish military contribution to the modernisation of Albanian Aimy has been 
enlarged with two issues. First one is that Turkish ammunition company MKEK has 
bought out and modernised the installations of the biggest ammunition plant in Albania 
to meet needs of Turkish and Albanian Army. Second point is that Turkey has supplied 
radar systems for the surveillance of the Albanian air space and of telecommunication
equipments.232
4.2.2 Macedonia
In the wake of declaration of her independence, Macedonia faced a security 
threat from her neighbours, in particular Greece. Macedonia, being isolated in the 
region with tense relations with all of her neighbour, suffering from a lack of a 
international recognition, weakened by economic conditions and ethnic problems, and 
lacking a military capability to deter Greek aggressions, welcomed Turkey’s public 
support to her independence and territorial integrity. Turkey believing that the 
preservation of the stability of this small weak country was essential for the peace and
“ Albania, Turkey Start Joint Military Exercises”, Turkish Daily News, 8 November 1995 
Balkanlar ve Türkiye 'nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikaları Sempozyumu, pp.206
Kipreos, Manolis, ‘Turkish strategic targets in Albania”, www.3dpaper.gr/eng/analyses/albaniagreece 
_an030101.shtml
103
security of the region supported her recognition, and improved her bilateral relations 
with that country in a short period of time."^^
Military relations between the two states were initiated with the visit of 
Macedonian Chief of Staff to Turkey in June 1993. Due to Macedonia’s deteriorating 
situation, close military relations between Macedonia and Turkey have been deepened 
and the two states signed several military agreements in a short time. In tliis field, 
military training cooperation activities started in 1994 in accordance with the provisions 
of the agreement on military training cooperation signed by two parties in March
1994 234
To set up a legal basis for this cooperation and develop further enhanced 
military relations, both sides have made a score of high-level military visits to each 
other. Macedonian high level military visits made in the recent years include the visit of 
Chief of General Staff, the visit of Deputy Chief of General Staff, and the visit of 
Defense Minister. In the same way, Turkish Defense Minister, several delegations from 
different departments of General Staff, and a delegation from Army War Academy have 
conducted military visits to Macedonia.
With the context of the agreement on military training cooperation, Turkey has 
been offering education and training to Macedonian military personnel in Turkish 
military institutions, namely Armed Forces Collage, Army Staff College, Language 
School, and Schools of Air F o r c e s . U p s  to now, 60 Macedonian military personnel 
have completed their education and training in these institutions.
Gangloff, Sylvie, ‘The Relations between Turkey and Macedonia: The Incoherencies of a Political 
Partnership’ Turkish Review: Balkan Studies, Annual 2001, vol.6, pp.37-56.
Akyiiz, Türkiye'nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile Yakınlaşmada 
Önemi, pp. 111.
Balkanlar ve Türkiye 'nin Bölgeve yönelik Politikaları Sempozvumıı, pp 209.
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Macedonian Army, having no air force after independence, led two states to 
cooperate in the field of air forces."^^ To this end, in 1996, an agreement foreseen the 
training of Macedonian pilots by Turkey was signed. Within the context of this 
agreement, 3 Macedonian pilots completed their training in 1998.^^’ Besides pilot 
training, Turkey offered selling 20 F-5 combat planes by means of donation and credit, 
and Macedonia welcomed this proposal.^^* But, this project became aborted.
Cooperation in training between the two states’ War Academies has also 
begun. A platoon from Macedonian Army War Academy consisting of 40 cadets has 
been participating in practical training of Turkish Army War Academy each year since 
1998.
Another cooperation field in the military training is the special forces training 
activities conducted in Turkey and Macedonia. In 1997, 24 personnel from Macedonian 
Special Forces were given commando training. In the same way. Special Forces under 
the command of Turkish Naval Forces offered similar courses 9 Macedonian military 
personnel in 1998, and it was agreed that the special forces training activities should be 
continued in Macedonia. To this end, a team consisting of 6 personnel from Turkish 
Special Forces began to train Macedonian Special Forces in Macedonia in 2000. Upon 
these forces being deployed in the border region to be used against the separatist groups, 
Turkish team returned Turkey in 2001.
Turkey has been contributing to the development of Macedonian Army by 
means of logistic support, including donation of equipment and ammunition, and 
assisting to the training of logistic support units. In this respect, Turkey donated 1.9
Gangloff, ‘The Relations between Turkey and Macedonia: The Incoherencies of a Political 
Partnership’ pp.37-56.
Akyiiz, Türkiye’nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile Yakınlaşmada 
Önemi, pp. 111.
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million dollars worth of a military assistance consisting of equipment and ammunition
3^9in June 1999.“ In addition, Turkey accepted to train and equip a Macedonian Logistic 
Support Battalion, which will cost 1 milhon dollar to Turkey.
Turkey and Macedonia have been making better use of PfP program to 
improve their close military relations. Macedonia, being a PfP country, participated in 
the opening ceremony of Turkish PfP Center, and designated her 18 military personnel 
to the courses given by the Center.
Last but not least, military exercises have been a significant tool to deepen 
enhanced military relations. In May 1997, the first military exercises between two states 
were conducted in Macedonia with the participation of a special team of 70 Turkish 
troops.^ '^ ®
Macedonia and Turkey have participated in a significant number of exercises 
together with their units and they have invited each other to many exercises that they 
have conducted under PfP and national programs. The two states have participated in 
these exercises together wit their units in 2000 and 2001;
• Cooperative Dragon, conducted in Albania in June 2000,
• Cooperative Key, conducted in Romania in September 2000,
• Cooperative Best Effort, conducted in Romania in September 2000,
• Seven Stars, conducted in Bulgaria in September 2000,
• SEEBRIG CAX, conducted in Bulgaria in March 2001,
• Cornerstone, conducted in Albania between April and July 2001,
• Seven Stars, conducted in Bulgaria in June 2001,
• Cooperative Best Effort, conducted in Australia in September 2001,
Turkish Daily News, iun t 1999. 
Hürriyet, May 12, 1997.
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• Rescuer, conducted in Bulgaria in September 2001.
In addition, Macedonia has been invited to these exercises conducted by the 
Turkish Armed Forces in 2000,
• Joint Battalion Task Force (BNTF),
• Peaceful Star,
• Mehmetcik,
While Macedonia participating in these exercises excepting the exercises of 
Joint BNTF as an observer, Turkey participated in Corner Stone conducted in 
Macedonia as an observer in the same year.
4.2.3 Bulgaria
Turkey and Bulgaria belonging to the rival alliances during the cold war did 
not have an opportunity to establish bilateral relations in the military field. With the end 
of Cold War, the first contact in this sphere in the level of the General Staff was made 
with General Mehmet Onder’s participation in negotiations with Bulgaria in 1991.“'*' 
The two states revealed their enthusiasm to cooperate in defense and security issues and 
then Bulgaria and Turkey established and exemplary relations in the military field.
First enhanced military relations, including the activities of military training 
and cooperation, between Turkey and Bulgaria were initiated with the military training 
cooperation agreement signed in 1992 following the adoption of the Sofia Document 
and Edirne Document, and the agreement on cooperation in the military field signed in 
1997 by the Defense Minister of Bulgaria and the General Staff of the of Turkey. '^*  ^ In
Özgür, Nurcan, ‘1989 Sonrası Türkiye-Bulgar İlişkileri’, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, Faruk 
Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp.345-383.
http://bulgaria2000.virtualave.net/agreements_for_military_co.htm
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accordance with these two agreements, mainly following activities are being conducted
between two countries:““*^
• High-level military visits,
• Mutual port visits and participation in exercises,
• Participation in exercises as observer,
• Mutual delegation visits,
• Mutual conferences.
In the context of high-level military visits, both sides to reveal her willingness 
for the improvement of enhanced military relation made many high level military visits 
to each other recently.^ "^ "^  Bulgarian high level military visited Turkey several times in 
1998 and 2000. Bulgarian Defense Ministers as well as Bulgarian Naval Forces 
Commander also visited Ankara in the same years at the different dates. Many high 
level visits have been made to Bulgaria by Turkish military officials at the different 
levels, including Chief of the General Staff, Defense Minister, Commander of Naval 
Forces, r'‘‘ Army Commander, the Deputy of Chief of The General Staff, Commander of 
the Land Forces in the recent years
In addition, mutual group visits have also been conducted between two sides. 
While Bulgarian group visits have been made by the students of Naval War Academy 
and the Shooting Team of Bulgarian Armed Forces, Turkish visits have been made by a 
group from Military Staff Collages, the students of Naval War Academy and the regular 
visitors of National Defense Collage.
There is another dimension of the enhanced military relations between Ankara 
and Sofia. 27 personnel from Bulgarian Armed Forces have been trained in Turkish
Balkanlar ve Türkiye 'nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikaları Sempozyumu, pp.208.
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military institutions. For 2003, the education of 7 personnel, including 1 personnel for 
Armed Forces Collage, 1 for Army War Academy, 1 for medicine course and 4 for 
Turkish Language course, have been planned. In addition, 91 personnel of Bulgarian 
Armed Forces have participated in the seminars and conferences in the Turkish PfP 
Center.
In the same way, personnel of Turkish Armed Forces have been participating 
in training and education activities in Bulgaria. So far 4 personnel have been given 
Bulgarian language course, and 3 personnel have participated in the seminar of 
CHARALITZA-2000, the theme of which is Simulation Systems and Models.
Last but not least, both sides have willingness, and they are in search of new 
ways and activities to further develop cooperation in this field. They are about to 
complete regulations that will broaden mutual education and training activities in 
military staff collages, language schools, branch schools and other institutions.
As for the exercises, they have been rather good instruments to strengthen 
enhanced military relations. Two states have conducted joint exercises themselves, 
participated m PfP exercises and invited each other to their national exercises as 
observer.
One of the first exercises conducted jointly by two states was Poyraz 1-94. It 
was carried out by these state’s naval forces in the Black Sea.^ '^  ^ Another example of 
joint exercises was Cooperative Communications-96, a communications exercise. It was 
carried out with the participation of only Bulgarian and Turkish tactical signal units, 
deployed each on its side of the border area near the Kapitan Andreevo (Southern
Özgür, Nurcan, ‘1989 Sonrası Türkiye-Bulgar İlişkileri’, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, Faruk 
Sönmezoğlu, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp.345-383
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Bulgciria) and Kapıkule (Turkey) border checkpoints. The exercise was in the spkit of 
the activities under the Partnership for Peace program. The aim of Cooperative 
Communications-96 was to test the technical compatibility of individual signal means. 
It was commanded from a joint coordinating center with representatives of the two
246arnues.
In recent years, the number of exercises conducted to develop cooperation is 
on the increase. To this end, m 2001 and 2002, the military personnel of these states' 
came together in these exercises:
Turkey participated in SEVEN STARS-2001, carried out by the SEEBRIG in 
Bulgaria, with a mechanised infantry battalion. Turkish Defense Minister and 
Operational Chief of General Staff took their place on the distinguished day of this 
Exercise.
In July 2001, Mutual Border Unit Training and Manoeuvre program 
organized jointly by Turkish and Bulgarian land forces. A Bulgarian military delegation 
came in Turkey within the scope of this program. General Hayri Kivrikoglu greeted the 
visiting delegation and said that Turkish and Bulgarian soldiers were working together 
to protect the border, and this situation would bring the two peoples closer to each other. 
The head of the visiting delegation, Gen. Ivan Dobrev, also said that relations between 
the two countries had improved since 1990, adding that they were determined to further 
improve relations.^" ’^
FBIS, Join Exercises with Bulgaria in Black Sea, 6 July 1994, in Birgül Deinirtaç-Coçkunj The 
Exemlary Relationship in the Balkans: Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Cold War era, Bilkent 
University Institute of Economic and Social Sciences, Ankara, August 1999, pp. 51.
“Bulgaria, Turkey: Military Cooperation”, www.hri.org/news/balkans/bta/96-l l-21.bta.html#02 
Turkish Daily News, 25 June 2001
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In the same year, the following exercises conducted within the sprit of 
National and PfP by Turkish Armed Forces, military personnel from Bulgarian Armed 
Forces participated in as observer:
• Efes-2001,
• Deniz Kurdu-2001,
• Joint BnTF-01,
• Deniz Yildizi-01,
• Karadeniz Ortaklik-2001
• Peaceful S tar-2001.
In 2002, similar exercises also planned and carried out in the same way. Some 
of them are the followings;
• Mutual Border Units Exercises carried out both in Bulgaria and Turkey 
in April 2002,
• The Exercise of Mutual Unit Exchange conducted in Turkey in May
2002,
• Seven Stars-2002, SEEBRIG exercise, carried out in Bulgaria with the 
participation of Turkish units designated for the brigade,
• Deniz Kurdu, conducted by Turkish Armed Forces with the 
participation Bulgaria as observer,
•Corner Stone, SBEERIG exercise, carried out in Bulgaria wit the 
participation of an engineer company from Turkey,
• BREEZE-02, carried out in Bulgaria with the participation of naval 
forces of two countries,
• Karadeniz Ortaklik-2002, carried out in Black Sea with the
111
4.2.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Enhanced military relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey were 
initiated with the signature of Agreement on Military Training Cooperation in January 
1996. Within the context of this agreement, to assist Bosnian Army for reaching NATO 
standards, mainly these activities are conducted: '^^®
• High-level military visits,
• Mutual delegation visits,
• Participation in exercises as observer,
• Training of Bosnian military personnel in different branches,
• Contribution to the Train and Equip program,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey having close bilateral relations during the
Bosnian Crises and after the Dayton Peace Agreement have made many high-level 
visits to each other. For instance, in the period following the Agreement on Military 
Training Cooperation, mutual high level military visits have continued to develop 
further enhanced military relations, and Bosnia- Herzegovina’s Chief of General Staff 
both in 1997 and 1999 as well as Defense Minister in 1997 visited Turkey to that end. 
Although there has been made many Turkish visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the 
highest-level Turkish military visit were conducted by the Land Forces Commander in 
1996.
Turkey has been offering education and training Bosnian military personnel in 
both Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Turkey, Bosnian military personnel have been
participation of a ship from Bulgarian Naval Forces.
Akyüz, Tıırkiye 'nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile Yakınlaşmada 
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educated and trained in the Turkish military institutions, including military staff 
collages, Army War Academy, Air War Academy, Giilhane Military Medical Academy, 
Language School, military high schools, branch schools of Land, Air Forces and 
Gendarmerie Command and technical schools of Air F o r c e s . U p  to now, 497 
Macedonian military personnel have completed their education and training in these 
institutions.
Other than education and training given at these institutions, Turkey has been 
giving short-term courses on different branches to Bosnian military personnel. In this 
context, Turkey trained 462 Bosnian military personnel only in 1998,^^° and she has 
been offering the courses Bosnian Army demanded. For example, 3 Bosnian personnel 
participated in the course of commandership and HQ officer in 2000, and several 
courses on UH-1 helicopter maintenance were given to 7 personnel in 1999. However, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina not being a PfP country cannot participate in the activities and 
courses of Turkish PfP Center.
Apart from these activities conducted in Turkey, several activities have been 
conducted in Bosnia. First one of these activities is the opening of a Turkish language 
classroom and laboratory in 1999 by the Land Forces Command to educate personnel of 
Bosnian-Croat federation’s Army. For the language classroom and laboratory, 2 Turkish 
officers were assigned as teachers and 187 officers and NCOs has been educated up to 
now. In addition, second Turkish language classroom was opened by Bosnian Air 
Forces Command in 2001, and Language School of Turkish Land Forces provided even 
its necessary documents. Second training activity is the course, them of which is
Balkanlar ve Türkiye 'nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikaları Sempozyumu, pp 207.
Akyüz, Türkiye ’nin Balkanlarda Etkin ve Sürekli Politika İzlemesinin Avrupa ile Yakınlaşmada Önemi 
,pp.l09.
113
commandership and HQ officer, given by Turkish Army Staff Collage in 2000. 53 
personnel participated in this course.
Turkey is also one of the countries making greatest contribution to the Train 
and Equip project, which is conducted under the Dayton peace accord. This project was 
initiated by the US in August 1996 in order to bring Bosnia's Muslim-Croat Federation 
up to military balance with the Serbs by the time NATO-led peace forces leave the 
country so that they are not encouraged to resume hostilities. Train and Equip program, 
which costs about $800 million, consists of two components, namely military 
equipment and training. While Muslim countries and US provide military equipment for 
the program, training is offered in Muslim countries, in particular by Turkey, few
5^1European countries and US."
In accordance with the Train and Equip program, Turkey gave training lasting 
10 terms to Bosnian military personnel, and she trained personnel of 2 tank battalions 
and 2 artillery battalions of Bosnian-Croats federation.^^“ In total, 1919 personnel, 
including 1228 Bosnians and 691 Croats were trained. The training activities have been 
ended with the completion of 10-term training period in December 1998 due to 
difficulties that they created for Turkey. However, Turkey has begun to give the same 
training at the leader level in Turkey, and sent military advisors to guide the training 
activities conducted in Bosnia. As Turkey has been trying to make every effort to 
contribute regional peace and stability through creation of a Bosnia having sufficient 
military capability to secure her independence and territorial integrity, US State 
Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns, praised Turkish effort to that end. He 
criticised the European countries that refused to support any of the measures decided
Bosna-Hersek ve Kosova Hava Harekatı, Hava Kuvvetlen Komutanlığı, Ankara, 2002, pp. 30 and see 
also Turkish Daily News, August 28, 1996.
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upon in the pledging conference for the Train and Equip program, held in Ankara on
March 1996.-^^
As for exercises, since Bosnia could not participated in the exercises 
conducted in the sprit of NATO’s PfP program owing to not being a PfP country, 
Turkey could invite Bosnia only to her national exercises as an observer. These are 
some examples of the exercises that Bosnia and Herzegovina has participated in as an 
observer in the recent years:
• Joint Battalion Task Force-2000, 2001, 2002
• Winter-2000,2002
• Mehmet9Ík-2000,2002.
4.2.5 Romania
With the collapse of communism system, Romania has undertaken deep 
political, social and economic transformations. Hence, her economy has witnessed a 
constant recovery^^"  ^ and she began search for integration with the western institutions, 
namely EU and NATO.^^^ Changes in her policy and macroeconomic stabilization of 
her economy presented new cooperation opportunities for Turkey and Romania in the 
early 1990s. On such a fertile ground, Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations, in 
particular commercial, have steadily developed, based on friendly relations and the
excellent political climate between the two countries.256
-5^  www.hri.org.news/turkey/trkpr/96-03-28.trkpr.html.
A Balkan tale of transformation, progress and success, Turkish Daily News, December 1, 1996. 
Manea, Mihai, “Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Romanya Diplomasisi” translated by Osman Karatay, 
Balkan Diplomasisi, Ömer E. Lütem-Birgül Demirtaş-Çoşkun, ASAM Yakınları, Balkan Araştırma 
Dizisi:3, Ankara, 2001 pp. 263.
A Balkan tale of transformation, progress and success, Turkish Daily News, December 1, 1996.
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Romania’s enthusiasm to be a member of NATO and her active participation 
in PfP program' has brought this country close to Turkey in security and defense 
issues to take her support to achieve NATO membership, which is her foreign policy 
priority. To this end, first contacts in the military field were made in January 1992 with 
the visit of Romanian Defense Minister. During this visit, two states signed an outline 
agreement for the military cooperation. After a short period of time, during Turkish 
Chief of General Staff visit to Romania, agreement on training, technique and scientific 
cooperation in the military field was concluded between two states’ Chief of General 
Staff. Since then, enhanced military relations, including mutual visits, exchanges of 
information, observations of exercises and participation in PfP exercises, between two 
states have being carried out with the annual implementation plans in accordance with 
this agreement.^^*
Both sides have made numerous visits and meetings at the highest level to 
represent their strong support for the development and diversification of enhanced 
military bilateral relations. To illustrate, Romanian Chief of General Staff four times. 
Commander of Naval Forces, Defense Minister, Commander of Air Forces have visited 
Turkey since 1998, and Turkish Chief of General Staff four times. Defense Minister, 
Commander of Land Forces, Commander of Naval Forces and Commander of Air 
Forces have visited Romania in the same period.
Training activities within the framework of cooperation agreement conducted 
in both Turkey and Romania. The activities conducted in Turkey include long-termed 
education activities in Turkish military institutions and short-termed courses on 
different branches. Up to now, 9 Romanian military personnel have completed their
Manea, Mihai, “Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Romanya Diplomasisi” translated by Osman Karatay, 
Balkan Diplomasisi, Ömer E. Lütem-Birgül Demirtaş-Çoşkun, ASAM Yajm lan, Balkan Araştırma 
Dizisi;3, Ankara, 2001 pp. 263
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education in the military institutions, including military staff collages, language schools. 
Commando School. In the short termed courses, GATA have given courses on different 
subjects in the field of war surgery to 21 Romanian military personnel. Further more, 
158 personnel have participated in the courses and seminars of the Turkish PfP Center 
up to now.
Training activities conducted in Romania focuses on education of Turkish 
languages. Upon the Romanian request, Turkish Chief of General Staff opened a 
Turkish language laboratory at the Romanian Military Staff Collage in 1997. With the 
appointment of a Turkish officer as a teacher for the laboratory, Turkish language 
education began in Romanian Army. Up to now, 41 Romanian officers has taken the 
Basic Turkish Language Course. In addition, Turkey started to send a staff officer to 
Romanian High Staff Collage in 2000. 2 staff officers have completed their education in 
Romanian High Staff Collage.
Romania and Turkey have participated in a significant number of exercises 
together with their units, and they have invited each other to many exercises that they 
have conducted in the spread of PfP and national programs. Both sides took part in the 
Hazerfan-97 exercise, carried out under the umbrella of the PfP in Turkey. The exercise 
aimed to improve the training and cooperation of military personnel. Tactics on air 
traffic control, the control of airspace and flight training was practiced, and search and
9 SOrescue operations as well as parachuting were also examined.
In 1999, Turkey and Romania, together with Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine, 
participated in the Joint Black Sea Corporation-99, which was conducted in the western 
Black Sea region. The aim of the exercises was announced as promotion of cooperation 
and training between littoral states, providing support for joint peace efforts and
Balkanlar ve Türkiye 'nin Bölgeye yönelik Politikaları Sempozyunnı, pp 62.
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enhancing Turkey’s political and military influence in the region by a statement made 
by the Chief of General Staffs information center."^®
In the recent years, two states have also participated in the exercises of 
SEEBRIG together with their units and Romania participated in Karadeniz Paitnership- 
2002 conducted under command of Turkish Navy with a frigate. While Turkey 
participated in the exercises of air defense unit of Romanian army, Romania has 
participated in the following exercises conducted in Turkey as an observer:
• Denizyildizi-2001,
• Peaceful Star-2001,
• Karadeniz Partnership-2001,
• Mehmetçİk-2002.
In addition, although Turkey invited Romania as an observer to the exercises, 
including Search Rescue and Denizkurdu in both 2001 and 2002, Romania did not 
participate in these exercises.
Other than training cooperation, Turkey and Romania are searching for 
cooperation in defense industry. To discuss and explore new ways of cooperation, 
bilateral defense industry meeting has been conducted every year. Some of the defense 
industry cooperation issues, which are on the agenda, include cooperation in the 
production of military garment, cooperation in the standardization, cooperation in the 
production of armored personnel carrier and cooperation in quality guarantee.
Turkish Daily News, August 9, 1997 
Turkish Daily News, September 20, 1999.
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4.2.6 Croatia
With the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Turkey has been one of the 
first countries recognizing the independence of Croatia and has established good 
bilateral relations with that country. After the out break of war due to Serbian 
aggressions the establishment of a common front among Bosnians and Croats against 
Serbian aggressions became an important factor to deepen bilateral relations. During the 
war, Croatia intended to improve close military relations with Turkey. However, Turkey 
did not approach this request enthusiastically due to international arms embargo on 
Croatia and the balance with Bosnia. After the establishment of peace with Dayton 
Agreement, negotiations in the military field started. Since the military necessities and 
defense budget of Croatia decreased compared to the war period, close military relations 
focused on the military training cooperation.^^' In this process, two sides signed the 
agreement outline on training, technique and scientific cooperation in the military field 
during the visit of Croatian President Franco Tudjman in Ankara on 19 March 1996.^^  ^
On 23 August 1996, the two states concluded military training cooperation in Zagreb. 
Thus, legal basis for the military cooperation between two parties has been established.
Military training activities between Turkey and Croatia have been conducted 
in accordance with this agreement. Up to now, 593 Croatian military personnel have 
completed their education and training in Turkish military institutions, including branch 
schools of Land Forces and Air Forces Commands, Army Staff Collage, Giilhane 
Military Medical Academy, language schools. Besides, 38 personnel have been going 
on their educations in these institutions, and 20 more have been planed for 2003-2004.
261 Yürür, Pınar, “ Tarihi Süreç İçersinde Hırvatistan Dış Politikası”, Balkan Diplomasisi, Ömer E. 
Lütem-Birgül Demirtaş-Çoşkun, ASAM Yayınları, Balkan Araştırına Dizisi:3, Ankara, 2001 pp. 276-277 
224. Turkish Daily News, June 14, 1996.
277 Turkish Daily news, August 24, 1996.
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Turkey has been offering Croatian military personnel short-termed courses on 
different branches. Some of them are courses on command of infantry battalion, 
command of artillery battery, and command of infantry company. In addition, Croatian 
military personnel have been participating in the courses and seminars conducted by the 
Turkish PfP Center. Up to now, 18 personnel have taken part in these activities.
The exercises are another field of cooperation for two states. They invite each 
other to the exercises they conducted in the sprit of national and PfP program as 
observer. In recent years, Turkey has invited Croatia to several exercises, but Croatia 
could participate only in Mehmet9ik-2000. In the same way, Croatia has invited Turkey 
to participate in DALMATIA-02, but Turkey could not participate in this unscheduled 
exercise, either.
Besides training cooperation, Turkey and Croatia are making efforts for 
cooperation in defense industry. To this end, Turkey took the first step with the visit of 
a military delegation headed by Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense in 1994. The 
Turkish delegation visited defense-related industries and discussed the production 
programs and possible business cooperation with high-level military officials of Croatia 
and representatives of firms. Following this visit, mutual visits to search for cooperation 
in this field started. In December 1994, a group of expert in defense cooperation field 
visited Croatia, and a Croatian delegation was in Turkey in March 1995 for further 
contacts.^^"  ^ Furthermore, Croatian Chief of General Staff together with the Force 
Commanders visited Turkey in 2000 and negotiated buying F-16 and deepening 
cooperation further.“'^  ^ Although parties have not been able to initiate a joint project.
Söylemez, Yüksel, “An Overview of Turkish-Croatian Relations”, Turkish Reviev of Balkan Studies, 
1996-7, v .3 ,p .9 9 -114.
Yürür, Pınar, “ Tarihi Süreç İçersinde Hırvatistan Dış Politikası”, Balkan Diplomasisi. Ömer E. 
Lütem-Birgül Demirtaş-Çoşkun, ASAM Yayınları. Balkan Araştırma Dizisi:3, Ankara, 2001 pp 223.
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they agreed to conduct defense cooperation meetings between them. In this process, the 
first meeting was conducted in Croatia in October 2002.
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CONCLUSION
For Turkey, the Balkans has had a significant importance in Turkey’s foreign 
policy agenda. Turkey realising the strategic importance of the Balkans for the real 
peace and stability of herself and the region endeavoured to take part in every scheme 
actively, and played a leading role in several multilateral Balkan co-operation schemes.
Since the establishment of republic in 1923, Turkey has pursued a policy 
aimed at contributing to the achievement of lasting peace and stability in the Balkans. 
To this end, right after the signature of the Lausanna Treaty (23 July 1923), she 
normalised her bilateral relations with all Balkan states except Greece. With the solution 
of the population exchange problem with Greece on 10 June 1930, Turkey found a 
suitable ground for the establishment of the first regional formation. Turkey, believing 
that regional peace and stability can only be ensured by means of regional framework 
which prevents great power intervention in the region suggested a Balkan Pact. For the 
realisation of the Balkan Pact, Turkey played an active role and took the lead in the 
Balkans. With the establishment of the Balkan Pact among Turkey, Romania, Greece 
and Yugoslavia on 9 February 1934, parties guaranteed their borders and promised not 
to sign an agreement with any Balkan state without consulting each other. In October 
1940, upon Italy attacking Greece, and the events taking place in the Balkans, Balkan 
Pact, the first formation established among Balkan states was finalised.
During the Cold War, Turkey, being a Western oriented state and member of 
NATO, could not pursue an active and effective policy in the region as she had pursued 
in the interwar period. Her membership to NATO and other Western organizations 
pushed her to collaborate with them. In other words, she could pursue an autonomous 
and independent Balkan policy to the extent that NATO allowed. Her role like the other
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Balkan states was relegated to regional politics. Since the regional states were divided 
into blocks and came under the influence of the super powers, they searched for 
integration into the international organizations such as NATO and Warsaw Pact rather 
than on regional organizations.^^^ However, Turkey, aiming at maintenance and status 
quo, endeavoured to promote security in the region. She took the lead in the 
establishment of regional security cooperation in the multilateral level, as she did 
interwar period and achieved forming a security belt on her eastern border with the 
Balkan Pact of 1954 with Greece and Yugoslavia. According to the provision of the 
Balkan Pact Agreement, this alliance would be valid for 20 years, and any attack to a 
member of the Pact would be considered, as an attack to aU parties and it would be 
repulsed collectively.However, from 1955 onwards, as Turkey and Greece entered in 
a severe conflict due to Greece’s expansionist intentions on Cyprus, the Balkan alliance 
lost its efficiency and significance.“^ ^
With the end of Cold War, there have been remarkable changes in Turkey’s 
immediate environment. In the periphery of Turkey, including the Balkans, Caucuses 
and Middle East have emerged new instabilities and uncertainties due to disintegration 
of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and historic grievances in these regions. Under these 
circumstances, Turkey, considering that her security rests on the promotion and 
insurance of the peace and stability in her adjacent regions, decided to give more 
importance to the military training cooperation, partnership for peace program, 
organizations of multilateral peace force, and increase her contribution to peacekeeping 
operations.^^^ Thus, to contribute to the promotion of the regional peace and stability in
■^ ‘’Barlas, ‘Tiirkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold War Eras’, pp.65-80. 
Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Poliîikas (1919-1973), pp.257-262.
Annağolu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-980), pp 524, in Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye 
(1945-1965) Siyasal Bilgiler Yayını, Ankara, 1969, ss.35-125.
269 Approach of Turkish Armed Forces to Regional Peace ”, www.tsk.mil.tr, 10 March 2003.
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return to consolidate her security, she has pursued a multilateral activist policy unless 
her national security threatened.
In the Balkans, Turkey did try to influence the developments for her own sake 
and in line with her own national interest right after tlie end of Cold War. To that end, 
Turkey established good political and economic relations as many Balkan states as 
possible and contributed actively to stability in the region definitely favoured Turkey’s 
national i n t e r e s t . I n  this period, Turkey not only made an effort to improve her 
bilateral relations with Balkan states, she also urged them to use aU available means to 
promote co-operation, rejecting a return to the divergences of the past.^^'
In the Balkans, the most remarkable contribution to the promotion of regional 
peace and stability has been in the field of military. Turkey’s military efforts for peace 
have been not only in the bilateral level, but also in the regional as well as international 
framework.
Turkey’s contributions to peace operations in the region, which is examined in 
the second chapter, have been in the context of international organizations including 
UN, NATO and OSCE. In this era, Turkey has fully supported and participated in the 
following peace forces and operations operate under the authority of UN, NATO and 
OSCE in the former Yugoslavia and Albania:
UNPROFOR, 04 August 1993-20 Dec. 1995,
IFOR, 20 December 1995-20 December 1996,
SFOR, 20 Dec. 1996-and forward.
Operation Sharp Guard, 13 July 1992-02 October 1996,
Operation Deny Flight, 12 April 1993-20 December 1995,
Operation Alhed Force, 24 March 1999-10 June 1999,
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KFOR, 05 July 1999-and forward,
APOR, 18 May-7 September,
MPF, April-August 1997,
Operation Essential Harvest, 26 August-27 September,
Turkish contingents participated in these operations and forces have completed 
their missions successfully up to now. They have accomplished many operational and 
humanitarian tasks as presented in the study, and their efforts are going on at the 
moment in Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkish contingents’ success, impartiality and 
professionalism in these peace operations strengthen Turkish position in many respects. 
For example, the success in the policy of Turkish units toward the various ethnicities in 
their AORs serving with impartiality proved that the UN circles’, especially Secretary- 
General Butros Ghali’s argument that Turkey being a Muslim and regional state having 
cultural and historical ties to Bosnia can not stay impartiaP^ is groundless. In the same 
way, they also confirmed that Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian rejection to Turkish 
contribution because Turkish participation in the force would create problems in the 
Balkans" is baseless. More important than these, impartiality and success of Turkish 
units in these operations have disproved the allegations that Turkey intends to create 
neo-Ottomanic zone of influence in the Balkans, and it has become a major argument 
for Turkish Balkan policy emphasising cooperation with the West and international 
organization as much as possible and stressing economic integration and cooperation in 
the region.
^™Kut, ‘Turkey in Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self Restrain”, pp.39-45. 
’^ 'Öztürk,‘Türk Dış Politikasında Balkanlar’ pp.1-32.
Milliyet, May 17, 1995, and Akgönenç “Türklerin Balkanlar ve Bosnadaki Yeni Katkılarına Bir Örnek: 
Bosna’da Türk Tugayı”, pp 1846.
Islimye, Military Interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia: A Case Study for Peace Support 
Operations (Lessons For Turkey), p. 74 , in FBIS-WEU-93-035, February 1993.
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In the regional context, Turkey believing that the regional problems can only be 
solved by means of regional framework has also launched new regional initiatives and 
fully participated in other regional initiatives in the Balkans, such as the Stability Pact 
and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). MPFSEE, BLACKSEAFOR 
and CSBM Regime in the Black Sea serving as confidence building measures in the 
region are three of which ai'e presented in third chapter in detail.
MPFSEE was established and activated as a result of a process which began 
with the Defense Ministers of South Eastern European countries and USA taking a 
decision to improve the cooperation and coordination among the South-East European 
PfP countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia and 
NATO countries of Turkey, US, Italy and Greece in Sofia, in October 1997, and 
Turkey’s proposal to establish a Balkan deployment force. Turkey, aiming at 
contributing to regional security and stability, fostering good neighbourly relations 
among the countries in South-Eastern Europe in the context of the SEDM process and 
improving interoperability among the militaries of the Partner nations and NATO allies, 
has become influential in moving MPFSEE from a concept to a reality.
Since the MPFSEE was established, it has not only become a force for peace 
and stability, but also a force for co-operation and openness in the region. This initiative 
is expected to be helpful means in strengthening the ties between regional countries in 
these respects:
• It will provide a forum to address concrete opportunities for military-to-military co­
operation.
• It will allow participating countries to gain good experience training in a NATO 
environment. For Bulgaria and Romania, which are strongly pursuing NATO
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membership, SEEBRIG will be a great opportunity. Working with Greece, Italy, and 
Turkey will help them in this regard.
• For countries with bilateral issues to resolve, such as Albania and Macedonia, 
Macedonia and Greece, or Greece and Turkey, the SEEBRIG initiative gives 
defense and foreign affairs officials a common objective on which to focus their 
energies can also help eliminate the negative perceptions some countries have about 
others by broadening the dialogue among the member countries.
• This initiative also serves to promote the internal cohesion of the NATO alliance by 
increasing the interdependence of rival NATO members, Greece and Turkey.
Another important initiative, which is a tangible product of Turkey’s military 
efforts for peace in the region, is the BLACKSEAFOR. In the post-Cold War era, upon 
the elimination of the ideological divide in the Black Sea region, regional countries, 
including Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia and Russia, to make better use 
of the opportunities of new era have initiated talks on confidence-buUding measures in 
two separate processes in late 1998. As a result of these processes, the 
BLACKSEAFOR is activated in 27 September 2001 and the Document on SCBMs in 
the Black Sea has been adopted in 25 April 2002.
With the activation of the BLACKSEAFOR, it has been a tool for fostering 
peace and stability in the Black Sea as well as promoting regional co-operation and 
interoperability among the naval forces of littoral states. In the same manner, the 
signatories also confirmed that their main purpose is to contribute to the further 
strengthening of regional security, friendship, good relations and mutual confidence 
among theme.
Lopez, T. Joseph, “A Politico-Military Success in the Balkans”,www.hri.org/intpol.lopez.htm
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As for SCBM regime, it started with a Ukrainian proposal on economic 
cooperation as a political initiative in the BSEC framework in 1994. Turkey supported 
this proposal and pursued a constructive and decisive position in the negotiation 
process. She played an important role in the shaping of the confidence and security­
building regime and the negotiation process reaching a conclusion. Against Russian 
persistence on the issue of third countries and the positions of Bulgaria and Romania 
that are problematic due to the American position, Turkey acted as a conciliator among 
these states and she has become a balancing actor during the negotiation process.
With the coming into force of the Document on CSBMs in the Black Sea on 
January 1, 2003, it is expected to help to build mutual confidence by creating military 
transparency in the navy field and provide an important contribution to the joint efforts 
in transforming the region into a stable area.
Turkey’s military efforts for peace in the context of bilateral relations have 
also been very successful. In this field, Turkey, playing a leading role in the realisation 
of bilateral confidence and security building, made bilateral CSBM arrangements with 
Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia^’  ^ and improved her enhanced military relations with 
regional countries.
The most striking and successful example to the bilateral CSBM arrangements 
in the Balkans has been with Bulgaria. The "Sofia Document" on confidence and 
security-building measures between Turkey and Bulgaria initiated the first step taken in 
this direction.
Owing to the principle of indivisibility of security, the bilateral CSBM 
arrangements that Turkey concluded with Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania have a 
positive impact on confidence and security not only in the region, but also in the OSCE.
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The realisation of bilateral arrangements between Turkey and Bulgaria for the first time 
in 1990 has been a model for other OSCE countries. After the adoption of Sofia 
Document by Turkey and Bulgaria, other Balkan Countries made similar arrangements. 
In addition, during the considerations for the Vienna Document, upon various proposals 
inspired by the process initiated with measures established between Bulgaria and 
Turkey, the issue of bilateral CSBMs was referred to in the Vienna Document.
Improvement of enhanced military relations with the regional states has 
contributed peace and stability in several ways. First of all, Turkey’s close military 
cooperation with Albania and Macedonia have created a military balance to Greece and 
Serbia in the region and deterred Greece’s nationalistic and antagonistic policies toward 
these states. In the beginning of 1990s, the threat perception of Greece became an 
important source of insecurity in the region. She assessed that the fragmentation of 
former Yugoslavia could start a domino effect, which may give a way to a Greater 
Albania. She had problems even with Macedonia and did not recognize that state since 
the name “Macedonia” is associated with Greek history, culture and territory. In this 
connection, she perceived Albania and Macedonia as threats to her stability and 
security. She supported Serbian activities against the Muslims in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to maintain the Yugoslav Federation. As a reaction to the pro-Serb policies 
of Greece towards the Balkans, Turkey signed military cooperation agreements with 
Macedonia and Albania in the spring of 1995. Turkey, aware of the Greek position 
towards these states, aimed to prevent the recurrence of the same events that took place
“Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States Report of the Secretary-General”, 
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenarv/a50-412.htm.
“Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States Report of the Secretary-General”, 
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-412.htm
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina"^^. Thus, Turkey’s close military relations with these states 
created a balance, which enforced peace and stabUity in the region.
Turkey’s enhanced military relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina helps the 
same goal in the region. Turkey is one of the countries making greatest contribution to 
the Train and Equip project, which is conducted under the Dayton peace accord. This 
project aims to bring Bosnia's Muslim-Croat Federation up to military balance with the 
Serbs by the time NATO-led peace forces leave the country so that they are not 
encouraged to resume hostilities. While Muslim countries and US provide military 
equipment for the program, training is given in Muslim countries, in particular in 
Turkey, few European countries and US.
Another important contribution of enhanced military relations to regional 
peace and stability has been in the insurance of mutual confidence in the bilateral 
relations. The most striking example to this is the enhanced military relations between 
Turkey and Bulgaria. Although Turkey and Bulgaria belonged to the rival alliances 
during the cold war, they have established and had exemplary relations in the military 
field right after the Cold War. Cooperation in defense and security field has prepared a 
proper ground for the rapid improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral relations.
Last but not least, to enhance stability and security in the Balkans, Turkey 
supports NATO enlargement process to include the region. To that end, she advocated 
Bulgaria and Romania be part of the second enlargement process, and this policy has 
brought out an important issue to bilateral relations with the regional states. Since, 
Turkey had the second military capability and an influence in NATO, the regional 
countries aiming to be a member of NATO seek Turkey’s support and approach Turkey 
in defense and security issues. In this connection, Turkey inaugurated her PfP Center in
277Barlas, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation Interwar and Post-Cold War Eras’, pp.65-80.
Ankara on 29 June 1998 and concluded a number of militiuy training and cooperation 
agreements to contribute to the armies of the regional states to reach NATO’s 
interoperability standards by providing educational and training support.
To conclude, Turkey’s military efforts for peace in the Balkans have become 
a good argument for Turkey’s stabilising role in the region and her Balkan policy, 
which stress regional cooperation and integration as weU as acting together with the 
Western and International community as much as possible. Although Turkey has lost 
her political interest regarding the Balkans since 1995, Turkish Armed Forces have been 
active and successful in the region. However, the successful activities of Turkish Armed 
Forces can not be turned into political gains. To that end, Turkey’s military efforts, 
positive steps to bring lasting peace and stability in the Balkans, deserves to be 
completed with the economic dimension which has been a key to both better bilateral 
relations and regional stability in the region and also deserves the support of all 
interested parties.
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